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The words ‘law and order’ have so frequently been misused as an excuse 
for oppression that the very phrase has become suspect in countries which 
have known authoritarian rule . . . There is no intrinsic virtue to law and 
order unless ‘law’ is equated with justice and ‘order’ with the discipline of 
a people satisfied that justice has been done . . . The true measure of the 
justice of a system is the amount of protection it guarantees to the weakest. 
Where there is no justice there can be no secure peace. 
    -Daw Aung San Suu Kyi1
INTRODUCTION
One of civil society’s most enduring beliefs has been that “fundamental 
values of the human spirit” lie at the core of all humanity.2 This notion, that 
a “common denominator of behaviour [exists], even in the most extreme 
circumstances,” has been a bedrock element of civilization since at least the 
time of the ancient Greeks.3 In protection of these societal values, 
behavioral codes have been established and penalties enforced against those 
who have committed wrongs against their fellow man; this fact has been 
noted by historians, philosophers, and ruling authorities from countless time 
periods throughout recorded history.4 Yet even well–intentioned attempts at 
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           1. AUNG SAN SUU KYI, FREEDOM FROM FEAR AND OTHER WRITINGS 176–77 (Michael 
Aris ed. 1991) (quote selected from Aung San Suu Kyi’s essay, In Quest of Democracy)
[hereinafter FREEDOM FROM FEAR]. 
 2. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 1 (2001). 
 3. Id.
 4. See, e.g., DEUTERONOMY 5:17 (NIV) (stating that the Hebrew Ten 
Commandments—said to have been specified by God and established as law for the 
Israelites—included “[y]ou shall not murder.”). One way in which this Commandment was 
enforced by the Israelites is spelled out in DEUTERONOMY 19:11–13 (NIV):
But if a man hates his neighbor and lies in wait for him, assaults and 
kills him, and then flees to [another] cit[y], the elders of his town 
shall send for him, bring him back from the city, and hand him over 
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implementing justice have not been without issue, as traditionally penalties 
have been enforced by a dominant group—or a war’s victor—and often 
reflected significant elements of partiality.5
It was with these societal values in mind—as well as a desire for 
principled, legal fairness—that the global community sought to create a 
judicial body where humanity–based justice would not be obstructed by 
unbridled ferocity, structural bias, or ineffective action. In essence, the 
nations of the world intended to build on the past strengths of societal 
justice and eradicate—to the best of their abilities—the obvious limitations 
of earlier enforcement systems.6 Building off the essential codification of 
humanity’s fundamental values in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights7—as well as the reiterated need for a global institution to provide 
justice in the midst of atrocities like those committed by the Nazis or those 
perpetrated in Yugoslavia and Rwanda8—the International Criminal Court 
(“ICC” or “the Court”) would be definitively established in 2002.9
to the avenger of blood to die. Show [this murderer] no pity. You 
must purge from Israel the guilt of shedding innocent blood, so that it 
may go well with you.  
The philosopher John Locke also suggests that the binding moral codes of mankind are of 
significant importance—and are worthy of being enforced by threat of consequence:  
[A]nd thus it is, that every man, in the state of nature, has a power to 
kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury, which 
no reparation can compensate . . . and also to secure men from the 
attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reason, the common 
rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust 
violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war 
against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a 
tyger, one of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no 
society nor security: and upon this is grounded that great law of 
nature, Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be 
shed. 
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT Ch. II, § 11 (1690), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtr02.txt. 
 5. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 1. 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 22 and 23. 
 7. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, at 71, U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (1948). 
 8. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 10–11 (“[In 1993, w]hile the draft statute of an 
international criminal court was being considered in the International Law Commission, 
events compelled the creation of a court on an ad hoc basis in order to address the atrocities 
being committed in the former Yugoslavia.”); Id. at 11 (noting that a second ad hoc tribunal 
was also created for the nation of Rwanda in 1994). 
 9. See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for 
signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter 
Rome Statute]. 
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While nearly a decade old at the time of this Article, the ICC represents a 
streamlining of humanity’s past efforts to protect its most sacred behavioral 
constraints. In fact, one of the ICC’s principle goals is to “put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of . . . crimes [that concern the international 
community] and thus . . . contribute to the prevention of such crimes.”10
Taken in this light, “[t]he International Criminal Court is perhaps the most 
innovative and exciting development in international law since the creation 
of the United Nations.”11
Despite this apparent mandate for the Court to hold accountable all 
criminal perpetrators whose actions rise to international attention, the Rome 
Statute “emphasiz[es] that the International Criminal Court . . . shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”12 It is only when a 
nation’s judicial system is unable to—or worse—is perversely unwilling to 
prosecute a perpetrator for mankind’s heinous crimes that the ICC is able to 
exert jurisdiction over the matter.13 Regrettably, the Republic of the Union 
of Myanmar—known more commonly as Burma—is one such nation 
unwilling to prosecute its criminal perpetrators due to their ruling 
leadership’s rampant corruption. 
Burma is a nation that—since 1990—has been illegitimately controlled 
by a military junta14 known as the State Peace and Development Council 
(“SPDC” or “the Regime”).15 During its rule, the world has been witness to 
“severe, indeed widespread and systematic abuses [of the Burmese people] 
that appear to rise to the level of state policy.”16 The dire situation existing 
within Burma was thoroughly detailed in a report by the International 
Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School, entitled Crimes in Burma.
Their research helps expose the SPDC’s heinous crimes and advocates for 
the United Nations Security Council to do the following: 
 10. Id. pmbl. 
 11. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 20. 
 12. Rome Statute, supra note 9, pmbl. 
 13. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 54–55. 
 14. See White House: U.S. To Support U.N. Inquiry in Myanmar, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 
18, 2010) (“[SPDC General] Than Shwe’s loyalists overturned election results in 1990 that 
favored the political party of Aung San Suu Kyi.”), available at 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/08/18/white-house-us-to-support-un-inquiry-in-
myanmar.html. NDI Condemns Conviction of Aung San Suu Kyi, NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST.
(Aug. 12, 2009), http://www.ndi.org/node/15684. National Democratic Institute Chairman—
and U.S. Secretary of State in the Clinton Administration—Madeleine K. Albright referred to 
SPDC leadership in Burma as “despotic and illegitimate.”
15. MICHAEL W. CHARNEY, A HISTORY OF MODERN BURMA xiii, 179 (2009) (“In 
November 1997, the SLORC [State Law and Order Restoration Council] was dissolved and 
replaced by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) . . . [m]ost foreign observers 
of Burma view the replacement of the SLORC with the SPDC as merely a cosmetic 
change.”).
 16. INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, HARVARD LAW SCH., CRIMES IN BURMA 4 (2009) 
[hereinafter CRIMES IN BURMA]. 
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Declare that the situation in Burma constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security and initiate a formal investigation through a 
Commission of Inquiry to investigate crimes committed in Burma . . . 
[f]urther, the Security Council should be prepared to act upon findings and 
recommendations made by such a Commission, including a potential 
referral to the International Criminal Court.17
Essentially, Crimes in Burma acts as an indictment of the SPDC for 
violations of humanitarian law and human rights. The goal of this Article is 
to expand on this Report and other global accusations against the Regime. 
More specifically, this Article intends to detail how the actual trial of SPDC 
leadership—namely Generals Than Shwe, Maung Aye, and Thura Shwe 
Mann (“the SPDC Generals,” “the Defendants,” or “the Generals”)—would 
unfold before the International Criminal Court.  
Part I of this Article will detail the historical progress that led to the 
creation of the ICC, as well as a general overview of the Court’s structure. 
Part II will highlight the ICC’s jurisdiction and admissibility, which will 
then be applied contextually to the alleged SPDC crimes. Pre–trial 
investigation and other requisite actions will be covered in Part III, and the 
actual trial of the Regime’s leadership will be assessed in Part IV. Namely, 
Part IV will address the Prosecutor’s allegations of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, the application of each charged crime’s criminal elements 
to the actions of the Defendants, and the defenses that the Defendants will 
likely put forth. Part V will be a prediction as to their guilt or innocence, as 
well as an analysis of the punishments that may result. Part V will also 
highlight the appeals process should it be applicable to the case of the 
Defendants. Concluding remarks on a speculative ICC trial and the current 
state of Burma will then follow. 
I. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
A. The Buildup to ICC Creation 
As noted in this Article’s introduction, the civilized world holds a long–
standing desire to protect its basic principles, yet—in terms of actual 
prosecution—history shows this guarding of mankind’s core values on more 
of a culture–specific18 or erratic level.19 In fact, it was not until the mid–
 17. Id. at 4. See also White House: U.S. To Support U.N. Inquiry in Myanmar, supra 
note 14. Some of the same suggestions announced in Crimes in Burma have gained notable 
traction with world leaders, as “[t]he Obama administration has decided to support the 
creation of a United Nations commission to look into alleged crimes against humanity and 
war crimes in Myanmar.” This will hopefully help lead to the situation in Burma being 
referred to the ICC for trial—the central theme of this Article. 
 18. See Deuteronomy 5:17, 19:11–13 (NIV). 
 19. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 1 (“The first genuinely international trial for the 
perpetration of atrocities was probably that of Peter von Hagenbach, who was tried in 1474 
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Nineteenth Century that holding people judicially responsible for their 
abuses against humanity began to emerge as a more formalized, global 
concept. The first idea for a formal international criminal court was 
vocalized in the 1860s by Gustav Monnier—a founder of the Red Cross.20
While the idea was apparently too revolutionary for its time, its legacy 
would help influence actions similar in spirit to the modern ICC—including 
a limited commission of inquiry investigating the “atrocities committed 
during the Balkan Wars.”21 However, since commissions like this were only 
inspective in nature—meaning they lacked any true global mandate for 
administering prosecutorial justice—credible international prosecution for 
abuses of humanity “would have to wait until Nuremburg.”22
The trial of Nazi war criminals following World War II would act as the 
first contemporary experiment in true criminal prosecution at a global 
level.23 This series of tribunals—known commonly as the Nuremberg 
Trials—sought to punish the Nazis for instigating the War—specifically 
their “offences against the laws and customs of war,”24 as well as for crimes 
against humanity25—namely their barbaric, cruel treatment of Europe’s
Jewish population. While the prosecution and subsequent punishment of 
for atrocities committed during the occupation of Breisach. When the town was retaken, von 
Hagenbach was charged with war crimes, convicted and beheaded.”). Linda Grant, Exhibit 
Highlights the First International War Crimes Tribunal, HARVARD LAW BULLETIN (Spring 
2006), http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/bulletin/2006/spring/gallery.php (“Von Hagenbach, 
appointed governor by Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, was told to keep order in 
Austria’s territories on the upper Rhine. In fulfilling the [D]uke’s directive, von Hagenbach 
terrorized the population. . . . Charged with violation of ‘the laws of God and man,’
specifically murder, rape and perjury, among other crimes,” von Hagenbach faced judgment 
from 28 judges assembled from across the numerous states of the Holy Roman Empire.). 
 20. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 2. 
 21. Id.
 22. See id. at 3–4. Following World War I, the Versailles Treaty did in fact allow for 
the German army to be subject to war crimes tribunals—which became known as the 
“Leipzig Trials.” However, “[t]he trials looked rather more like disciplinary proceedings of 
the German army than any international reckoning.” Due to German misgivings, the Allied 
powers allowed for the trials to be held before German courts and merely “prepared lists of 
German suspects”—lists that started at around 900 individuals but would only result in 
roughly one dozen trials and merely a handful of limited imprisonment terms. This evidences 
that international prosecution technically took place before the Nuremburg Trials of World 
War II, but this Article argues that genuine, international prosecution was non–existent in the 
Leipzig Trials—as the application of justice in this war crimes tribunal was effectively a 
façade due to the hesitancies and biases present on each side of the Leipzig Trials. In a sense, 
the entire situation merely paid lips service to the protection of society’s behavioral values.). 
 23. Id. at 7. The Pacific Theatre also held an international criminal tribunal: the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East—known more commonly as the Tokyo 
Trials. With both the Nuremburg Trials and the Tokyo Trials taking place concurrently, it is 
necessary to mention that both together are the first contemporary international criminal 
prosecutions, but for the purposes of this Article I will only detail Nuremberg—based on its 
immense notoriety—to effectuate my point. 
24. Id. at 2. 
 25. Id. at 7. 
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countless Nazis by way of the Nuremberg Trials was unquestionably
deserved—which is important to mention as the steadfast opinion of this 
Article’s author—it must also be noted that these criminal prosecutions 
were conducted by World War II’s victors, the Allied Powers. Although the 
Nuremberg Trials were the first contemporary prosecutions at a structured, 
international level—a powerful milestone in world history—it is also fair to 
assert that partiality could never be fully removed from the Tribunal as a 
result of the prosecutorial role of the conflict’s victors. However, while 
Nuremberg perhaps held slight biases, the Tribunal’s presence in itself 
marked an important step forward in the goal of protecting societal values—
as the winning side of the international community made clear that they 
considered valued social norms relevant even in the midst of global war. 
In the wake of Nuremberg, the world recognized that the time had come 
to express a unified front regarding the condemnation of crimes against 
humanity and the protection of civilized behavioral values. This global guilt 
of conscience arose out of the fact that—from the planned eradication of the 
Jewish ethnicity to the intended purge of the mentally retarded and 
handicapped—millions of innocent people had lost their lives in the wake of 
Nazi occupation. In the hope that a tragedy of such magnitude could 
feasibly be deterred in the future—or at least be suitably prosecuted, “the 
[United Nations] General Assembly adopted the Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” (CPPCG).26
The CPPCG not only elementally defined the crime of genocide and 
listed its prosecutorial requirements, but it also stated that future trials for 
genocide would occur in “a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of 
which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may 
have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have 
accepted its jurisdiction.”27 Following the enactment of the CPPCG, the 
United Nations (“UN”) General Assembly would task a Commission and a 
Committee with the drafting of a statute for such an international criminal 
court, as well as a penal code of crimes that would be applied in the court’s
 26. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 7 (noting that the term genocide first saw judicial use 
in the Nuremberg Trials as a charge leveled against Nazi war criminals by the Prosecutor. 
However, the term did not appear in the convictions of the defendants. Instead, these war 
criminals were convicted of a charge seen as parallel: crimes against humanity.). See also 
2007 Global Conference on the Prevention of Genocide—What is Genocide, MCGILL 
FACULTY OF Law, http://efchr.mcgill.ca/WhatIsGenocide_en.php?menu=2 (last visited Nov. 
13, 2010) (“The word ‘genocide’ was coined by Raphael Lemkin (1900–1959), a Jewish 
Polish lawyer, following the Nazi destruction of the Jews of Europe. He used a combination 
of Greek and Latin words: geno (race or tribe) and cide (killing). Lemkin was describing ‘a
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the 
life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.’”). See generally
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 
Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951). 
 27. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra
note 26, art. VI; SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 7–8. 
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jurisdiction.28 Yet while the United Nations had moved relatively fast to 
codify the genocide problem that World War II brought to the international 
forefront, the process of acting on the UN’s instructed measures would take 
much longer. This delay in drafting a statute for an international criminal 
court and its provisional codes can be attributed in no small part to the 
rising Cold War that engulfed international relations in the post–World War 
II era. In fact, the respective work of the UN–established Commission and 
Committee was stagnated from 1954–1981 as a result of this and other 
bureaucratic issues of the United Nations.29 Moreover, it was not until 
1989—following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the impending collapse of 
the Soviet Union—that the international criminal court conception would 
even appear to be within reach instead of some distant notion.30 In essence, 
the UN stopped delaying its own progress and began to focus more closely 
on establishing the ICC—a global, judicial body intended to implement 
justice, promote fairness, and hopefully limit the prosecutorial biases of old. 
Numerous meetings of the UN’s Ad Hoc Committee would take place in 
the mid–1990s. This body was instituted to streamline the progress made by 
the UN Committee and Commission noted supra. The Ad Hoc Committee’s
productive work would lead to “the Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
conven[ing] on 15 June 1998 in Rome”—a global conference intended to 
finalize provisions for the ICC.31 “The enthusiasm was quite astonishing, 
with essentially all of the delegations expressing their support for the 
concept [of an international criminal court].”32 Over the course of the 
Conference, however, it became evident that the global community still held 
 28. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 8 n. 25, 8–9 (The UN General Assembly established 
the Committee on International Criminal Court Jurisdiction (Committee) to draft a statute for 
an international criminal court; the General Assembly tasked the International Law 
Commission (Commission) with drafting criminal codes for the court. Specifically, the 
Commission would create the “Nuremberg Principles” and the “Code of Crimes Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind.”).
29. Id. at 9. Another bureaucratic issue included the UN’s methodical attempts at 
defining a “crime of aggression” for the future CPPCG–based court’s penal code. For more 
information on the “crime of aggression,” see infra note 40. 
 30. See id. at 9. The idea for a criminal court with permanent international 
jurisdiction was re–raised in 1989 by Trinidad and Tobago through Resolution 44/89 in the 
UN General Assembly. Trinidad and Tobago sought to have its problems related to narcotics 
trafficking addressed by such a court—at this point the Court itself had been discussed for 
generations but never had gained enough traction to be a true reality. Ironically, as of this 
Article the ICC does not hold jurisdiction over the illegal drug trade, but regardless Trinidad 
and Tobago may be thanked for breathing new life into the international criminal court idea. 
See also id. at 9–11. Despite the UN’s re–energized goal of establishing an international 
criminal court, the drafting process would not be finished quickly enough to prosecute the 
crimes taking place in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s; instead, ad hoc
tribunals were created to handle the situations in the absence of a permanent ICC). 
 31. Id. at 15. 
 32. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 15. 
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issue with many key elements of the ICC, including “the role of the [UN] 
Security Council, the list of ‘core crimes’ over which the court would have 
inherent jurisdiction and the scope of its jurisdiction over persons who were 
not nationals of State parties.”33 Eventually, a consensus would be reached 
between more than the two–thirds of States needed for adoption of an ICC 
treaty, and by a vote of 120 in favor to 7 against (with 21 abstentions) the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted on July 17, 
1998 by the world forum.34 The Statute’s adoption made it a “non–binding 
international treaty”—despite its support from “an overwhelming majority 
of the States that attended the Rome Diplomatic Conference”—until it 
entered into force by the ratification of 60 States on July 1, 2002.35
B. An Overview of ICC Structure 
1. Substantive Structure 
According to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
“[t]he jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community.”36 These crimes are: genocide,37
war crimes,38 crimes against humanity,39 and criminal aggression.40 The 
 33. Id. at 17. 
 34. Id. at 17–18. Israel, the People’s Republic of China, and the United States were 
notable votes against the Rome Statute.  
 35. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT–95–17/1–T, Judgment, ¶ 227 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/tjug/en/fur-tj981210e.pdf; Rome Statute, supra note 
9, art. 126 (stating that “[the Rome] Statute shall enter into force on the first day of the month 
after the 60th day following the date of the deposit of the 60th instrument of [State] 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary–General of the United 
Nations.”). See also Letter from John R. Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control 
and International Security, to Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations (May 6, 
2002), available at http://amicc.org/docs/bolton.pdf (noting that the United States’ December 
31, 2000 signature of the Rome Statute was subsequently suspended on May 6, 2002; the 
United States, while once a signatory, never officially ratified the Statute and stated via 
Bolton “its intention not to become a party” to the Court); see also Administration Update,
THE AMERICAN NON–GOVERNMENTAL ORGS. COALITION FOR INT’L CRIM. COURT,
http://amicc.org/usinfo/administration.html#null (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (explaining that 
U.S. concerns over ratification of the Rome Statute have included the trial of U.S. citizens 
without consent from the United States government, the potential of the ICC to try U.S. 
leaders for crimes of aggression, political motivations by the ICC against U.S. citizens and 
leaders, and potential conflict between the ICC and U.S. Constitution on due process rights 
for defendants). 
 36. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 5(1). 
 37. Id. arts. 5(1)(a), 6. 
 38. Id. arts. 5(1)(c), 8. 
 39. Id. arts. 5(1)(b), 7. 
 40. Id. arts. 5(1)(d), 5(2). See also Aaron Gray–Block, ICC States Reach 
Compromise on Crime of Aggression, REUTERS.COM (June 11, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65A6SE20100611 (noting that the recent 
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prosecution of these crimes at a fixed, global level raises many important 
discussion points. First, it must be recalled that the ICC was established as 
merely a complementary criminal court to those existing at national levels.41
By noting its balancing status, it should also be remembered that the ICC 
will only exert its jurisdiction where such crimes exist and a State is unable 
or unwilling to prosecute due to corruption. From this concept, it may be 
inferred that these crimes are addressed by the ICC for two key purposes: 
the international community feels cooperation at a global level may be 
needed to suppress such crimes and—more significantly—it appears the 
global population is finally ready to stand unified in their handling of 
mankind’s most dreadful actions. This latter point is particularly 
momentous as “violations of human rights . . . were once considered to lie 
within the exclusive prerogatives of State sovereignty”—yet now the ICC is 
capable of safeguarding these rights should it be necessary to do so in the 
absence of sincere State action.42
As well, the historical buildup to the ICC’s creation is due in large part 
to the evolution of customary international law, and knowing this the 
drafters of the Rome Statute left significant room for its further 
development.43 As highlighted in Part I (A) of this Article, human rights and 
basic behavioral values of the global community have typically been 
acknowledged through the tribulations of past atrocities and the customary 
legal developments that have occurred as a result. The Rome Statute’s
drafters knew it would be irrational for them to believe that the ICC’s
creation would mark the highest level of behavioral development possible in 
our global condition. Thus, they made sure that the ICC’s statutory 
guidelines would never hinder the further social improvements of humanity. 
For some, this statement may signal that other crimes may one day be 
defined and prosecuted by the ICC; for others, this assertion may invoke 
that elements of existing crimes may change. Overall, the protection and 
reverence for international customary law shows that the ICC is fluid in 
structure and willing to develop alongside the values and norms of the 
international order—an astute concept that will undoubtedly keep the ICC 
relevant and noteworthy for years to come. 
compromise adopted for crimes of aggression—a compromise that finally permits crimes of 
aggression to be investigated by the ICC—allows for the shielding from liability of 
permanent UN Security Council nations like Russia, the People’s Republic of China, and the 
United States, who will be able to prevent their own actions from being investigated). 
 41. Rome Statute, supra note 9, pmbl. 
 42. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 22. 
 43. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 10. 
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2. Procedural Structure 
“The ICC is an independent international organisation, and is not part of 
the United Nations system.44 Its seat is at The Hague in the Netherlands. 
Although the Court’s expenses are funded primarily by States Parties, it also 
receives voluntary contributions from governments, international 
organisations, individuals, corporations and other entities.”45 Four notable 
branches make up the bulk of the Court’s composition: the Presidency, 
Registry, Office of the Prosecutor, and the Judicial Divisions.46
a. The Presidency 
The Presidency consists of three judges elected to oversee the activities 
of the ICC. These judges—the ICC President and First and Second Vice 
Presidents—are elected by a majority vote of their ICC judicial colleagues 
for a three year term to direct the Court’s administrative activities, external 
affairs, and “judicial/legal functions.”47 Essentially, the Presidency’s role 
can be summarized as follows: 
In the exercise of its judicial/legal functions, the Presidency constitutes 
and assigns cases to Chambers, conducts judicial review of certain 
decisions of the Registrar and concludes Court–wide cooperation 
agreements with States. With the exception of the Office of the Prosecutor, 
the Presidency is responsible for the proper administration of the Court 
and oversees the work of the Registry. The Presidency will coordinate and 
seek the concurrence of the Prosecutor on all matters of mutual concern. 
Among the Presidency’s responsibilities in the area of external relations is 
to maintain relations with States and other entities and to promote public 
awareness and understanding of the Court.48
b. The Registry 
Additionally, the Registry is headed by the Registrar—under the 
Registrar’s direction “[t]he Registry provides judicial and administrative 
 44. Structure of the Court, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court (last visited Nov. 17, 2010) [hereinafter ICC, 
Structure of the Court]. The ICC does, however, maintain a “cooperative relationship with 
the U.N.”  See discussion infra Part II. 
 45. About the Court, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). 
 46. ICC, Structure of the Court, supra note 44. 
 47. The Presidency, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Presidency/The+Presidency.htm (last visited 
Nov. 18, 2010) [hereinafter ICC, The Presidency]. 
 48. Id.
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support to all organs of the Court.”49 As a neutral ICC branch, the Registry 
provides the Court with assistance for its basic functions—aiming to further 
ICC goals by conducting its activities with “quality, efficiency, transparency 
and timeliness.”50 Some of the Registry’s key areas of focus include: 
assistance for the defense council, preparation of victims and witnesses who 
will testify before the Court, management of the ICC temporary detention 
center where ICC–detained individuals are held, and the handling of the 
Court’s outreach to the global community.51
c. The Office of the Prosecutor 
The Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”) is itself a unique branch of the ICC 
structure. OTP is divided into three groups: the Investigation Division 
(“ID”), Prosecution Division (“PD”), and Jurisdiction, Complementarity 
and Cooperation Division (“JCCD”)—each operates under the overall 
direction of the Prosecutor.52 As noted prior, OTP is unique in that it is 
independent of the Presidency’s administrative control.53 This allows OTP’s
ID to examine alleged crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction in an unbiased 
fashion. Nevertheless, many restrictions do apply to the alleged crimes that 
may be investigated. Aside from the requirement of ICC jurisdiction,54 ID 
may only investigate an alleged crime if the State’s judicial power is unable 
or unwilling to do so in light of systematic corruption.55
In order to initiate an investigation, ID must first complete a preliminary 
analysis of the alleged crime. In this preliminary analysis, it must be 
determined whether an investigation would be in the interests of justice, the 
gravity and complementarity of the alleged crime, and whether there is “a
reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court 
has been committed or is being committed.”56 Also, during the preliminary 
analysis ID enlists the expertise of JCCD—a collection of “analysts, 
international Cooperation Experts and lawyers”—who offer their advice on 
 49. Registry, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-




 52. Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor.(last visited Nov. 18, 
2010). More specifically, while the Prosecutor is the overall leader of OTP, PD is headed by 
the Deputy Prosecutor and JCCD and ID have a Director/Head in charge of their operations 
respectively. 
 53. See ICC, The Presidency, supra note 47. 
 54. See infra Part II. 
 55. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 54–55. 
 56. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 53(1)(a). 
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the appropriateness of ICC jurisdiction and admissibility for potential 
prosecution of the alleged crime at hand.57
If an investigation is deemed worthy,58 it will be conducted by ID—
which will gather evidence and witness statements to try and corroborate 
details of the alleged crime.59 Once an investigation is complete, ID’s
findings will be presented to the judges of the Judiciary by the Prosecutor. 
Should the judges find that the evidence compels ICC action, the judges will 
issue summonses and/or arrest warrants for the accused perpetrators of the 
crimes.60 Once these defendants appear before the Court, PD will officially 
take over the case from ID. The charges may then be confirmed for the 
defendants, and if this occurs PD will begin their prosecution of the 
defendants before an ICC trial court.61
d. The Judicial Divisions 
The final branch of the ICC is the Judiciary, which maintains three 
distinct divisions: Pre–Trial, Trial, and Appeals.62 The Pre–Trial Division63
is crucial to the initial proceedings against an individual of ICC interest—
until the Prosecutor confirms or refutes the applicable charges against the 
defendant.64 In this timeframe, a Pre–Trial Chamber consisting of either one 
or (usually) three judges who will review the Prosecutor’s investigation 
authorization request to determine whether a reasonable basis exists for 
further examination into a defendant’s allegedly criminal conduct.65 Should 
it authorize an investigation, the Pre–Trial Chamber will then focus on 
establishing communication and cooperation with relevant States—as well 




st#id_3 (last visited Nov. 19, 2010) [hereinafter ICC, Frequently Asked Questions]. 
 58. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 53(1). 
 59. ICC, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 57. It is important to note that 
evidence and statement gathering may prove difficult—as typically these alleged crimes have 
taken place in volatile regions of the world. In some cases—like the ICC’s investigation into 
alleged crimes in Darfur—investigators have been allowed to work from afar and not even 
enter the dangerous region. 
 60. Id.
 61. See id.
 62. Chambers, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Chambers (last visited Dec. 29, 2010). 
 63. The Pre–Trial Division consists of two Pre–Trial Chambers that divide case 
responsibilities for ICC’s proceedings. See Pre–Trial Division, INT’L CRIM. COURT,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/chambers/Pre+Trial+Division/ 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter ICC, Pre–Trial Division].
 64. Id.
 65. Id. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 53(1)(a). Note that the Prosecutor’s 
authorization request for an investigation is grounded in ID’s preliminary analysis of the 
alleged crime committed by the defendant. 
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as protecting the rights of the defense, the efficiency of the ICC, and the 
interests of witnesses and alleged victims alike.66 Essentially, the Pre–Trial 
Chamber acts in paternalistic fashion to make sure OTP conducts the 
investigation competently and appropriately in accordance with the Rome 
Statute and the Court’s own established rules for Procedure and Evidence.  
The Pre–Trial Chamber is also the body that determines whether the 
Prosecutor’s investigation necessitates an arrest warrant for the accused 
sought. Upon a defendant’s surrender or proffered appearance stemming 
from an arrest warrant, the Prosecutor must prove to the Pre–Trial Chamber 
that the evidence found during investigation is adequate to “establish 
substantial grounds to believe that the [accused] committed the crime 
charged.”67 At this hearing, the defendant will be allowed to refute the 
Prosecutor’s evidence if possible, as well as present his or her own contrary 
evidence.68 This hearing will determine whether charges will be confirmed 
against a defendant; should this occur the case will be moved to the Trial 
Division by order of the ICC Presidency.69
Upon confirmation of charges against a defendant, a Trial Chamber will 
be established to determine his or her guilt or innocence.70 As well, the trial 
of the accused will be held publically unless this requirement would lead to 
a lack of adequate protection for witnesses, victims, evidence, or the general 
rule of law.71 In summary, “[t]he major role of the Trial Chamber . . . is 
adopting all the necessary procedures to ensure that a trial is fair and 
expeditious, and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused 
with regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.”72 Should the 
accused be found guilty, the three judges presiding over the Trial Chamber 
and its case will be able to enforce a term of imprisonment—“which may 
not exceed a maximum of thirty years or a term of life imprisonment.”73
Victim restitution and rehabilitation are also penalties the judges may 
impose on a guilty party,74 as well as other financial punishments.75
ICC Appeals Chambers hold responsibility for reviewing case decisions 
made by the Trial Chamber judges. The five judges of the Appeals Division 
together may hear petitions from both the Prosecutor and the defendant on a 
range of topics during every stage of a case. Some of the options include 




 70. Trial Division, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/chambers/trial%20division/trial%20divisi
on?lan=en-GB (last visited Dec. 30, 2010) [hereinafter ICC, Trial Division]; Rome Statute, 
supra note 9, art. 61(11).
 71. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 68. 
 72. ICC, Trial Division, supra note 70; see also Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 64. 
 73. ICC, Trial Division, supra note 70. 
 74. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 75(2). 
 75. Id. art. 77. 
2011] Justice in Burma  681
appeals concerning “decisions with respect to jurisdiction and 
admissibility,” “decision[s] of conviction or acquittal on grounds of 
procedural error, error of fact or error of law,” and rulings concerning “any 
other ground[s] that affect[ ] the fairness or reliability of the proceedings or 
decision.”76 As the definitive decision–maker in the ICC, the Appeals 
Chamber is entrusted with maintaining the fairness of each case—this 
power is exemplified in their ability to evaluate and alter established 
sentences, determine severe judicial misconduct, and rule on the fate of 
contested evidence.77 The judges in an ICC Appeals Chamber are supposed 
to ensure justice has been present in the actions of the lower courts—as the 
fate of those charged with crimes ultimately rests in their hands. 
II. ICC JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY
A.  Generally 
While interrelated, the concepts of admissibility and jurisdiction are 
differentiated by the ICC’s governing treaty, the Rome Statute.78 Put simply, 
“[j]urisdiction refers to the legal parameters of the Court’s operations”
while admissibility “seeks to establish whether matters over which the 
Court properly has jurisdiction should be litigated before it.”79 Thus, it may 
be possible for the ICC to have appropriate jurisdiction over a case but not 
be the proper forum for justice. 
1. Jurisdiction 
Briefly alluded to in Part I (B)(1), the ICC is limited in subject matter 
jurisdiction to war crimes, the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and the crime of aggression.80 Accordingly, if any of these crimes allegedly 
exist, then one factor for ICC jurisdiction has been met. A second—and also 
necessary—element for Court jurisdiction is the condition that the 
applicable crime be committed following the Rome Statute’s entry into 
force.81 By requiring this temporal jurisdiction, the Rome Statute eliminates 
 76. Appeals Division, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/chambers/appeals%20division/appeals%2
0division?lan=en-GB (last visited Jan. 2, 2011). It is important to note that the ICC President 
is one of the five judges of the Appeals Division. 
 77. Id.
 78. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, arts. 11–14, 17–20. 
 79. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 55. 
 80. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 5(1). For more specifics on developments with 
the crime of aggression, see Gray–Block, supra note 40. 
 81. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 11(1). See also id. art. 11(2). Typically the ICC 
will only have appropriate jurisdiction and admissibility over crimes that are committed after 
a State personally enters the Rome Statute into force via ratification; however, a UN Security 
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its own ability “to reach into the past and prosecute atrocities committed 
prior to its coming into force.”82 While some may consider this 
counterproductive, the inclusion of this jurisdictional obligation is perhaps 
one of the most significant reasons why the ICC was allowed to come into 
existence. It is not hard to imagine why either. No State wants to allow for 
all of their past mistakes to be held against them and their citizens in a 
newly created court—a legal entity which did not exist when they 
committed their crimes, and for mistakes that may have been the 
transgressions of past generations. Besides, national courts are still able to 
prosecute these crimes as they please—despite the lack of ICC jurisdiction. 
In theory, this should prevent a free pass from being given to the offenders 
of such atrocious crimes, but reality does make evident that some crimes 
will inevitably slip through the proverbial cracks of justice. Regardless, the 
establishment of a temporal jurisdiction requirement helped allow for the 
ICC’s ultimate creation—a noble criminal deterrent that will benefit the 
world greatly despite its imperfect nature. 
The ICC must also meet one of two final requirements in order to have 
appropriate jurisdiction over a crime—personal or territorial jurisdiction. If 
a crime meeting the Court’s temporal and subject matter jurisdiction 
requirements is committed on the territory of a State that has ratified the 
Rome Statute, then the ICC will hold territorial jurisdiction.83 This is 
“regardless of the nationality of the offender.”84 The Court “will also have 
jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory of States that accept its 
jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis and on territory designated by the [UN] 
Security Council.”85 Essentially the same requirements exist for ICC 
investigations seeking personal jurisdiction. The Court has personal 
jurisdiction for State nationals86 that are accused of committing crimes87
meeting the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction and temporal jurisdiction 
requirements as long as the national’s State has ratified the Rome Statute,88
Council exception exists in Article 13(b) and a willing non–party State exception is in Article 
12(3). 
 82. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 57. 
 83. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 12(2)(a). 
 84. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 62. 
 85. Id.; see supra note 81 for remarks on Articles 12(3) and 13(b) of the Rome 
Statute. 
 86. Article 10 of the Rome Statute is a provision that allows customary international 
law—both developing and existing rules—to remain an element the ICC should take into 
account for decision–making. The determination of a person’s nationality is an excellent 
example of Article 10’s intended use. See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 64 (“In accordance with 
general principles of public international law, the International Criminal Court should look at 
whether a person’s links with a given State are genuine and substantial, rather than it being 
governed by some formal and perhaps even fraudulent grant of citizenship.”).
 87. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 12(2)(b). 
 88. Id.
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accepted ICC ad hoc jurisdiction,89 or the matter was referred to the Court 
by the UN Security Council.90
Only certain immunities may prevent the ICC from exercising its overall 
jurisdiction—these include the inability to prosecute some diplomats and 
senior state officials according to international legal agreements, as well as 
the inability to prosecute individuals who were under eighteen years of age 
when they allegedly committed their crime.91 The Court may also be 
prevented from employing its jurisdiction by UN Security Council 
resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.92 While some of these 
jurisdictional roadblocks—like previous conditions mentioned—may appear 
detrimental to justice, it must be remembered that customary international 
laws, global treaties, and transnational compromises are part of the civilized 
order we seek to preserve. They even helped lead the ICC itself into 
existence. Without some concessions to accommodate the States who create 
these devices, a court of such global magnitude would fall apart like a house 
of cards. 
2. Admissibility 
It is the dynamic nexus between the ICC and State legal systems that sets 
the stage for whether the ICC may hear a jurisdictionally sound case. Article 
1 of the Rome Statute— according to the undertones of Article 17—asserts 
a central theme for admissibility: the ICC “shall be complementary to 
national criminal jurisdictions” when in the proper interests of justice.93 In 
other words, it is encouraged and expected that national legal systems 
exercise their sovereign authority to apply civil society’s justice. Thus, 
guidelines for what makes ICC jurisdiction inadmissible are predominant in 
the Rome Statute94—the intention of the Court is to assert jurisdiction only 
when a State’s legal structure is unable95 or corruptly unwilling96 to 
prosecute accused culprits for crimes found heinous by our global society.97
 89. Id. art. 12(3). 
 90. Id. art. 13(b). 
 91. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 64. 
 92. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 16. A UN Security Council resolution may put 
ICC action on hold for a period of 12 months by what is known as “deferral.” Since Article 
16 allows for this deferral to be renewed without expressed time limits, it may be argued that 
the UN Security Council has an indefinite ability to veto ICC prosecutions. 
 93. Id. art. 1. 
 94. See id. art. 17. 
 95. See id. art. 17(3) (“In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court 
shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national 
judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and 
testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.”).
 96. See id. art. 17(2)(a)–(c). Notable “unwillingness” elements include shielding 
people from criminal responsibility for crimes within ICC jurisdiction, unjustified delays in 
state court proceedings, and a lack of independence and impartiality in state court litigation. 
 97. See supra notes 12–13. 
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As such, if a State is investigating or prosecuting a case over which they 
have jurisdiction, the ICC will not typically interfere with the State’s
litigation process—the Court will only supersede state action if a “State is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution.”98 Ultimately, ICC action in this scenario will depend on the 
intentions and competency of the state legal system in question. This should 
not be interpreted, however, as the Court attempting to question the 
intelligence of state court methods.  
Nor will the ICC be able to simply step in and prosecute an individual 
whom a State court has decided not to charge with a crime following an 
investigation—an option for Court intervention would only be available to 
the ICC should the State court’s “decision result[ ] from [an] unwillingness 
or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute.”99 In keeping with the 
principle that the ICC “shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions,”100 it is apparent that the Court’s powers of admissibility here 
should also depend on the State court’s abilities and intentions and never 
include second–guessing the legal integrity of State court rulings due to 
basic differences in judicial opinion.101
B.  Application to the SPDC 
Part I (B)(2)(c) of this Article introduced the idea of the preliminary 
analysis—a process shouldered by the Investigation Division of the Office 
of the Prosecutor. In summary, preliminary analysis results determine 
whether the Prosecutor will request authorization from the judges of the 
Pre–Trial chamber to investigate a specific case. One of the main factors ID 
seeks to confirm in preliminary analysis is whether or not a reasonable basis 
exists to show that the alleged crimes and culprits in question fall under the 
jurisdiction and admissibility of the ICC.102
When considering the actions of Burma’s ruling junta—the SPDC—the 
simplest jurisdictional element to meet by reasonable basis will be subject 
matter jurisdiction. For decades “UN resolutions and Special Rapporteurs 
have spoken out about the abuses [in Burma] that have been reported to 
them”—abuses that appear to be Regime policy.103 A myriad of advocacy 
 98. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 17(1)(a). 
 99. Id. art. 17(1)(b) (emphasis added). 
 100. See id. art. 1 (noting the idea of complementarity). 
 101. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, arts. 17(1)(c), 20(1)–(3) (preventing  double 
jeopardy—only in cases where prior trials were conducted without independence and 
impartiality may the ICC re–try a case already litigated). 
 102. See supra Part I (B)(2)(c). 
 103. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at IV; see U.N. Security Council, Report of the 
Secretary–General on Children and Armed Conflict in Myanmar, U.N. Doc. S/2007/666 
(Nov. 16, 2007); see Human Rights Council Res. 7/31, Situation of Human Rights in 
Myanmar (Mar. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.altsean.org/Docs/UNHRC%20Resolutions/HRC%202008%207-31.pdf.
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groups104 and nations worldwide—including the United States 
government—have also denounced the social injustices attributed to the 
SPDC.105 Notwithstanding their disputed authority to govern Burma, the 
Regime has been repeatedly accused of crimes considered atrocious by the 
civilized world—including the forced displacement of persons,106
extrajudicial killings and torture,107 political imprisonments,108 the use of 
child soldiers,109 violent sexual crimes,110 and many other wicked deeds. In 
light of the various reports, observations, and witnesses claiming to 
corroborate these actions, there is little doubt that ICC subject matter 
jurisdiction exists. Specifically, a reasonable basis exists for examining 
whether war crimes and/or crimes against humanity have actually occurred 
as a result of Regime policy. 
With regard to temporal jurisdiction, ID and the rest of the Prosecutor’s
Office must be careful to lay distinction between criminal allegations 
arising from before and after the Rome Statute’s entry into force.111 This 
distinction must be made because crimes allegedly committed by SPDC 
 104. See, e.g., THE BURMA CAMPAIGN UK, http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2011); see Homepage, ALTSEAN BURMA,  http://www.altsean.org (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2011); see Burma , HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/asia/burma 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2011). 
 105. Steven Lee Myers, Bush, at U.N., Announces Stricter Burmese Sanctions, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/26/world/26prexy.html  (noting 
that before a session of the UN General Assembly, U.S. President George W. Bush “outlined 
a tightening of economic sanctions . . . to aim at specific individuals [of Burma’s SPDC] for 
the first time. He also announced a ban on visas of those ‘responsible for the most egregious 
violations of human rights’ and their families. ‘Basic freedoms of speech, assembly and 
worship are severely restricted [in Burma],’ Mr. Bush said. ‘Ethnic minorities are persecuted. 
Forced child labor, human trafficking and rape are common.’”); White House: U.S. To 
Support U.N. Inquiry in Myanmar, supra note 14 (“The Obama administration has decided to 
support the creation of a United Nations commission to look into alleged crimes against 
humanity and war crimes in Myanmar. . . . The White House said in a statement [ ] that it 
believes the commission could advance the cause of human rights in Myanmar, also known 
as Burma, by ‘addressing issues of accountability for responsible senior members of the 
Burmese regime.’”).
 106. See CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 39–51. 
 107. Id. at 64–74. 
 108. Thomas Fuller, Group Helps Political Prisoners in Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
18, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/18/world/asia/18iht-prisoner.1.19455492.html. 
 109. Burma Army ‘Recruiting Children,’ BBC NEWS (Oct. 31, 2007), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7069920.stm. 
 110. See CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 51–64. 
 111. See also Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 11(2) (“If a State becomes a Party to 
this Statute after its entry into force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect 
to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute for that State.”). Since Burma is 
not a State party to the ICC—and unlikely to accept ad hoc Court jurisdiction due to the 
many criminal accusations they have acquired—they will only be able to face ICC 
jurisdiction through UN Security Council referral. The Rome Statute’s entry into force 
date—July 1, 2002—is thus used for temporal jurisdiction since no State–based date exists 
for when Burma itself entered the Rome Statute into force. 
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leadership on or before July 1, 2002 will lack jurisdiction with the ICC.112
This is obviously disconcerting because the national judiciary in Burma has 
exhibited significant partiality for the Regime—a sign that these prior 
crimes may never see their day of fair judgment. Nevertheless, global 
accusations like Crimes in Burma have made clear that July 1, 2002 came 
and went with little impact on the egregious crimes taking place in Burma—
these crimes occurred before the Rome Statute’s entry into force as well as 
after.113 Put simply, while a Burmese family may not be able to see Regime 
leaders brought to ICC trial for the extrajudicial killing of their son in 1997, 
the father will hopefully see the leaders in question face trial on different 
alleged criminal charges that fulfill temporal jurisdiction. 
Perhaps the most intriguing (and unstable) prerequisite for ICC 
jurisdiction over Burma will be territorial/personal jurisdiction. With Burma 
not being a member State to the ICC’s Rome Statute, the actions of SDPC 
leaders personally—as well as any crime committed on Burmese territory—
will not automatically fall under the jurisdiction of the Court. Since it is 
highly unlikely the SDPC would ratify the Rome Statute for Burma or 
accept its ad hoc jurisdiction—in light of these notable criminal accusations 
made against them—the matter of territorial/personal jurisdiction will rest in 
the hands of the UN Security Council.114 The body, which includes five 
permanent members with absolute veto power,115 would have to vote to 
refer the situation in Burma to the International Criminal Court—a daunting 
task considering the close relationship between the SPDC and the People’s
Republic of China,116 as well as between Russia and the Regime.117 The 
author of this Article sees this as the most formidable roadblock for justice 
in Burma. With China and Russia having the ability to veto any referral 
resolution of ICC jurisdiction for Burma, the ability for these atrocious 
 112. The Rome Statute entered into force by State ratification on July 1, 2002. See 
also Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 126. 
 113. See CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 6. In fact, Crimes in Burma states that 
its statistics and findings from Burma “center[ ] on events since 2002” in order to use the 
Rome Statute’s temporal jurisdiction requirements as an “evaluative tool.”
 114. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 13(b) (establishing UN Security Council 
referral authority); id. art. 16 (establishing UN Security Council deferral authority). 
 115. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council are the United States, 
Russia, Great Britain, France, and the People’s Republic of China. See UN Charter art. 27. 
While not expressly stated, it is implied in the UN Charter that a veto by any of the five 
permanent members will put an end to a potential resolution—however, it is also implied that 
absence from a vote or abstention by one of the permanent five members will allow a 
resolution to be passed. 
 116. See Michael Bristow, Chinese Dilemma Over Burma Protests, BBC NEWS (Sept. 
25, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7011746.stm  (noting  that “China’s ties 
with the military junta ruling Burma go deep, and include expanding trade links, the sale of 
military hardware and diplomatic support.”).
 117. See Russia and Burma in Nuclear Deal, BBC NEWS (May 15, 2007), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6658713.stm. 
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crimes to be fairly assessed in a court of law may remain an idealistic 
dream.  
Despite this, this Article’s author believes it is not impossible to sway 
the minds of Russian and Chinese leadership with international pressure. 
First off, it is evident that the People’s Republic of China desires global 
influence and prestige—their ornate hosting of the 2008 Olympic Summer 
Games in Beijing is one of many examples suggesting this.118 By vocalizing 
a demand for criminal accountability in Burma, the nations of the world 
may be able to convince China to rebuke their SPDC allies. In the past few 
years “China has shown signs of promoting reform in Burma,” yet the 
reforms suggested have only hinted at “national reconciliation” and a 
restoration of “internal stability.”119 While an important step forward, this 
language may also be construed as China wanting the SPDC to end their 
alleged crimes and the Burmese people to simply forgive and forget what 
has happened. If the SPDC leadership were to do this, it would certainly be 
an encouraging gesture. However, what real change can take place by 
leaving allegedly vicious leaders in power? And what about the Burmese 
victims who wish to experience justice fulfilled in a court of law? Even 
though China has previously prevented the UN from criticizing Burma for 
its record on human rights,120 it remains slightly uncertain how global 
pressures may affect China’s future approach to an ICC referral vote. One 
thing is certain though—it may be argued that China has been swayed by 
global pressure before; they allowed the UN Security Council to refer the 
crimes in Darfur to the ICC121 despite their existing economic relationship 
with the Sudan.122 Thus, advocacy groups and countries alike must continue 
 118. See Victor Matheson, Great Games, Great Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/22/opinion/22iht-edmatheson.1.15546378.html 
(emphasizing the great lengths China went to in order to host an Olympics that would 
“announce its arrival as a major political and economic power.”).
 119. Bristow, supra note 116. Chinese Foreign Policy Advisor Tang Jiaxuan has 
stated that China “‘hoped Myanmar would restore internal stability as soon as possible, 
properly handle issues and actively promote national reconciliation.’” Id.
 120. See also Colum Lynch, Russia, China Veto Resolution on Burma, THE WASH.
POST, Jan. 13, 2007, at A12. 
 121. See S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1953 (Mar. 31, 2005). China abstained 
from voting instead of vetoing the Resolution; this allowed the Resolution an opportunity to 
be passed despite their obvious objections. See also Press Release, Security Council, Security 
Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, To Prosecutor of International Criminal Court; 
Resolution 1953 (2005) Adopted by Vote of 11 in Favour to None Against, with 4 
Abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, United States), U.N. Press Release SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 
2005). 
 122. See Moira Herbst, Oil for China, Guns for Darfur, BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 14, 
2008), http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/mar2008/gb20080314_430126.htm? 
chan=globalbiz_asia+index+page_economics+%2Bamp%3B+policy (noting that “Sudanese 
oil shipments to China increased 63% from 2003 to 2006. . . . In 2007, China purchased 40% 
of Sudan’s 25–million–ton annual output of oil, accounting for about 6% of all Chinese oil 
imports.”).
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to put the Burmese atrocities before the eyes of China and remind them that 
true global leadership depends on action as well as desire. 
On the other hand, Russia may be the more difficult UN Security 
Council member to persuade—due largely in part to the fact that, unlike 
China, they have never publically questioned their support for the SPDC 
and its policies. In fact, Russian Ambassador Vitaly I. Churkin has stated 
that “the situation in [Burma] does not pose any threat to international or 
regional peace. . . . attempts aimed at using the [UN] Security Council to 
discuss issues [like human rights in Burma] are unacceptable.”123 While 
incredibly difficult, it may not be impossible to persuade Russia into 
allowing ICC jurisdiction. Two strategies are noted infra.
The first strategy would be exposing Russia’s flawed, public conviction 
that the situation in Burma is not a threat to regional peace. While the SPDC 
has not been accused of warring with area states like Thailand or Laos, 
threats to peace have occurred in the region due to the number of refugees 
that have fled Burma to these nearby states.124 In Thailand alone, “some 
140,000 [Burmese] refugees live in nine remote camps.”125 Not only is the 
staggering number of refugees disconcerting, but there is also evidence that 
many Burmese refugees have experienced abuse at the hands of the Thai 
military. One horrendous accusation includes “refugees . . . being towed out 
to sea, cut loose and abandoned.”126 It is hard to imagine the plight of these 
people, as they have faced horrors in Burma as well as in the places they 
have sought shelter. This chaotic, violent instability suggests a real danger 
to peace in the region, and it is facts like these that must be publically 
conveyed to Russia. As noted with the People’s Republic of China, public 
sentiment is a powerful instrument. By exposing these crimes to Russia, and 
addressing them in a way where Russia must publically respond, these 
situations may compel Russia to change its view on Burma’s overall 
stability—potentially allowing the SPDC to face ICC jurisdiction. 
The second strategy would be to raise the public’s awareness of Russian 
economic ties to Burma. If global society was more conscious of the fact 
that Russia is entering into major business contracts with a military junta 
accused of outrageous crimes, then this might be enough to turn public 
opinion against Russian interests. This seems particularly feasible due to 
Russia’s standing contract with the SDPC to build a Burmese nuclear 
research center—a subject of general concern when in the hands of unstable 
 123. Russia and Burma in Nuclear Deal, supra note 117. 
 124. Peter Biro, On the Border: A Generation of Burmese Refugees in Thailand, INT’L




 126. Dan Rivers, Probe Questions Fate of                                   
Refugees in Thailand, CNN.COM (Jan.  26, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/ 
asiapcf/01/25/thailand.refugees/index.html#cnnSTCText. 
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nations like Burma.127 If pressure was mounted against the Russians to end 
these problematic business ventures, it may also lead Russia to cave to 
proponents of ICC jurisdiction for Burma—a move that could allow Russia 
to recover politically from the negative press mounted against its dealings 
with the SPDC. Essentially, if enough people, nations, and organizations 
were alarmed about the Russia–Burma relationship—especially their 
nuclear dealings—and broadcasted their disdain around the world, Russia 
might feel compelled to salvage its reputation like China did with Darfur.128
What better way to show their “disgust” with the SPDC’s alleged actions 
than to allow for the crimes in Burma to face ICC jurisdiction? 
While convincing China and Russia to allow for Court jurisdiction may 
be seen as a long shot, the interests, allies, and opinions of countries do 
change frequently in the contemporary world. Should Russia, China, and the 
other UN Security Council nations decide to refer the situation in Burma to 
the ICC,129 the Court will add territorial/personal jurisdiction over the SPDC 
and Burma to the already established subject matter and temporal 
jurisdictions. As such, the ICC would have proper jurisdiction over the 
case130—along with suitable admissibility. Burma’s judiciary has shown no 
desire to investigate the human rights violations alleged against the Regime. 
When considering the amount of concern being exhibited by the global 
community over these crimes, it is evident that Burma is a country 
unwilling to investigate its accused leaders. Thus, an ICC investigation of 
the crimes in Burma would also be admissible if merely allowed. 
III.  THE INVESTIGATION AND OTHER PRE–TRIAL ACTIONS
A.  The Investigative Process 
Should the Pre–Trial Chamber determine that a reasonable basis exists 
for jurisdiction and admissibility over the crimes allegedly committed by 
the SPDC Generals in Burma, the ICC Prosecutor and OTP will then initiate 
an investigation of the case.131 Distinct from common law jurisdictions like 
the United Kingdom and United States, the role of the ICC Prosecutor is 
more impartial and neutral than adversarial.132 In fact, an appropriate 
parallel would be to compare the Prosecutor to an investigating magistrate 
 127. Russia and Burma in Nuclear Deal, supra note 117. 
 128. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text (noting China’s handling of 
Darfur with the UN Security Council despite their economic ties).  
 129. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 13(b). 
 130. Additionally, no international agreements exist to shield senior SPDC officials 
from ICC jurisdiction. 
 131. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 15(1). Should the Pre–Trial Chamber reject 
OTP’s requested investigation authorization, the ICC Prosecutor may act proprio motu to 
initiate an investigation based on criminal “information” known to the Prosecutor. This 
clause maintains a level of independence for OTP and helps to prevent judicial bias. 
 132. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 103. 
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in civil law jurisdictions.133 As an investigator, the Prosecutor is presented 
with a high level of trust—as well as the responsibility to probe a situation’s
“incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.”134 During this 
investigation stage, the Prosecutor and OTP will examine every facet of the 
case to ascertain whether criminal responsibility exists under the Rome 
Statute for the crimes in question.135 The process may be grueling, as it will 
include locating and questioning witnesses and victims alike,136 gathering 
and reviewing evidence,137 and—when necessary—even “seek[ing] the 
cooperation of States or intergovernmental organizations.”138
What should happen then, if the SPDC were to be uncooperative with the 
Prosecutor’s investigative duties in Burma? Prima facie, it appears as if the 
Regime could stop the ICC Prosecutor’s case from ever advancing to a trial 
by preventing or stalling the investigative process inside the State. If it is 
determined that OTP would be unable to investigate alleged crimes in 
Burma due to SPDC tactics—a likely result should the case be probed 
there—then the Prosecutor may ask the Pre–Trial Chamber to authorize 
their investigation in Burma without the Regime’s consent.139 In reality, one 
must ask whether this is realistic. Even if the Prosecutor was given 
permission to investigate from the Pre–Trial Chamber, there is no real 
guarantee of individual safety—entry into Burma by OTP personnel would 
undoubtedly invoke hostility and potential violence against them. It is the 
opinion of this Article’s author that the ICC and its State parties have begun 
to recognize this shortcoming in the Rome Statute, and have wisely sought 
ways to circumvent it. One way is to allow the investigation to take place 
outside of Burma—OTP’s investigation into crimes in the Sudan was 
conducted in this fashion and thus sets precedent for such an action.140 This 
may result in a lack of certain witness/victim testimony and some portions 
of evidence, but it helps prevent exposing investigators and 
victims/witnesses alike to retribution that would be a major risk in Burma. 
B.  The Process of Arrest 
“At any time after the initiation of an investigation, the Prosecutor may 
seek a warrant of arrest from the Pre–Trial Chamber.”141 In order to 
 133. Id.
 134. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 54(1)(a); see also id. art. 53(1)(c) (noting that the 
Prosecutor is also trusted with the power to halt an investigation if it “would not serve the 
interests of justice.”).
 135. Id. art. 54(1)(a). 
 136. Id. art. 54(3)(b). 
 137. Id. art. 54(3)(a). 
 138. Id. art. 54(3)(c). 
 139. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 57(3)(d). 
 140. ICC Issues Darfur Arrest Warrants, BBC NEWS (May 2, 2007), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6614903.stm. 
 141. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 109. 
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convince the Pre–Trial Chamber that the arrest of a suspect is needed, the 
Prosecutor must provide them with evidence to show that “there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court.”142 The Prosecutor must also show that an 
arrest of the suspect appears necessary to guarantee the person will appear 
at trial, prevent the accused from disturbing Court and investigative actions, 
or stop the suspect from continuing their allegedly heinous crimes.143
Following the issuance of an arrest warrant by the Pre–Trial Chamber, the 
ICC will communicate this request to the governing authority of the State 
most intimately involved with the situation. It is the common desire of the 
ICC that suspects it issues an arrest warrant for will be brought to them by 
related state authorities for judgment. 
With the considerable amount of evidence, witnesses, and victims being 
generated by the SPDC’s alleged crimes, an investigation should not be 
severely hampered by its management outside of Burma. Consequently, a 
request by the Prosecutor should lead to arrest warrants being issued for 
three key figures in the SPDC military council—the Regime’s Chairman, 
Senior General Than Shwe; Regime Vice–Chairman, General Maung Aye; 
and General Thura Shwe Mann, former Joint Chief of Staff for the SPDC’s
armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw.144 While Burma’s heinous crimes 
may not have actually been committed by these three leaders themselves, 
they do control the SPDC as superior military commanders—meaning 
“effective authority and control” over their subordinates is both an 
advantage and burden of their positions.145 Under the Rome Statute, if 
military commanders are aware of—or are expected to be aware of—their 
subordinate military forces committing terrible crimes, and they have not 
taken all “necessary and reasonable measures within [their] power to 
prevent or repress [the] commission [of these crimes],” then these military 
commanders shall be held liable for the actions of their forces.146 This 
notion of respondeat superior, or command responsibility, will divide the 
SPDC’s alleged criminal responsibility amongst these three top Generals 
and establish part of the reasonable grounds for an ICC arrest warrant. The 
credentials for these arrest warrants will be further bolstered by the fact that 
without them these Generals would never consider appearing at trial. In fact, 
 142. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 58(1)(a). 
 143. Id. art. 58(b)(i–iii). 
 144. Jacob Leibenluft, Who’s in the Junta?, SLATE (June 2, 2008), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2192726. See Burma’s Than Shwe ‘Remains Senior General,’ BBC
NEWS (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11137293 (noting that 
“number three leader [ ] Thura Shwe Mann is said to have stepped down” from his SPDC 
leadership position) [hereinafter Burma’s Generals]. Regardless, this Article’s author 
believes the ICC should still hold him liable for his alleged criminal actions since July 1, 
2002. 
 145. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 28(a). 
 146. Id. art. 28(a)(i–ii); see also id. art. 27. 
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the arrest warrants appear to offer the greatest prospect for their Court 
appearance—as it may be used to leverage other members of the SPDC’s
military council into turning the Generals over to the ICC for trial. 
With Burma controlled by the SPDC’s military council—and at the 
highest level General Than Shwe—it would appear improbable for the 
arrest warrants to be carried out. With the ICC dependent on States to carry 
out the Court’s arrest warrants, it appears that a deal must be made between 
lesser members of the Regime’s military council and the ICC. While the 
SPDC is highly secretive, it is estimated that the military council consists of 
roughly eleven generals147—a figure that has probably changed following 
Burma’s faux elections in 2010.148 Undoubtedly there are crimes in Burma 
which trace their decisional roots to these lower military council leaders, 
and here is where the Court must make a tough decision in the best interests 
of justice. It is apparent that the ICC was established to judge offenders of 
the most heinous crimes when a State judiciary would be unable or 
unwilling to do so due to corruption. Like prosecutors in the United States, 
the ICC Prosecutor may have to strike a deal with lower level generals in 
the SPDC in order for the ICC arrest warrant to be carried out against the 
Regime’s top three. In reaching out to these lesser leaders on the military 
council, the Prosecutor may be able to persuade them to turn over their 
superior Generals. The deal could be structured to include an offer for the 
dismissal of their own criminal liability, as well as possible removal to a 
willing third party state should they desire it for safety purposes. While 
contingent on the extradition of these three leading Generals, the deal could 
also hinge on these lesser generals permanently resigning from power and 
allowing for free elections within the State. Ultimately, the deal established 
would be up to the Prosecutor to determine, but regardless of its added 
specifics it may be the most feasible option for justice. 
IV.  THE ICC TRIAL OF SPDC LEADERSHIP
A.  Initial Trial Aspects 
Once transferred to The Hague in The Netherlands—the permanent seat 
of the ICC—Generals Than Shwe, Maung Aye, and Thura Shwe Mann will 
 147. Leibenluft, supra note 144. 
 148. See Burma’s Generals, supra note 144 (claiming that the SPDC’s leadership 
“reshuffle saw more than a dozen senior military officers [resign] ahead of Burma’s
[November 2010] elections.”). See also FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: THE 
AUTHORITARIAN CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY 8 (2011), available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/fiw/FIW%202011%20Booklet_1_11_11.pdf. In 
November 2010 the SPDC “oversaw [Burma’s] first elections since 1990.  The electoral 
process was tightly controlled to ensure the government–backed party’s sweeping victory, 
and the popular opposition National League for Democracy was formally dissolved during 
the year.” Id.
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appear before the Pre–Trial Chamber for their confirmation hearing. In 
order to set criminal charges against the Defendants, the Prosecutor is 
required to show a sufficient evidential reason for each charge—with 
sufficiency being determined by the Pre–Trial Chamber.149 Afterwards, the 
Chamber will inform these Generals of the crimes they have been 
adequately charged with, as well as their rights under law, in accordance 
with the Rome Statute.150 The Prosecutor will then request continued 
detention for the Defendants during the trial, as the difficult pretenses that 
brought them to the ICC—namely betrayal by their subordinate generals—
undoubtedly means that the accused will attempt to escape from trial at any 
cost.151 Once all formalities have been addressed in the confirmation 
hearing, the substantiated occurrence of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity will lead the Pre–Trial Chamber to constitute a Trial Chamber for 
the SPDC Generals.152 From its inception, both the Prosecution and the 
Defense must begin the process of disclosure—in other words both sides 
will inspect the evidence that the other plans to use at trial. “The Prosecutor 
must also disclose any such items that may assist the defence, although a 
comparable duty is not imposed upon the defence to disclose items that 
might assist the prosecution.”153 Once evidence has been reviewed and 
voluntary witnesses have been located,154 the Court will officially begin the 
trial of the Defendants. 
The trial will commence with a re–reading of the charges confirmed 
against the Generals in the Pre–Trial Chamber. Following this, each of the 
accused will be asked to plead guilty or not guilty—the Defendants 
themselves will likely plead not guilty.155 This process, however, is unique 
under the Rome Statute—as it does not follow a typical civil law or 
common law approach.156 Instead, a guilty plea before the ICC Trial 
Chamber will be assessed by the judges for its context. Guilty pleas made 
“voluntarily after sufficient consultation with counsel [and with the support 
 149. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 116. 
 150. Id. at 113. 
 151. Id.
 152. See id. at 116. If criminal charges were not properly supported with evidence, 
then the Pre–Trial Chamber could simply decline to establish a Trial Chamber; the 
Prosecutor could also amend the charges with new evidence and attempt to have the 
defendants charged at a future confirmation hearing. 
 153. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 117; see also ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
Rules 77–78, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F1E0AC1C-A3F3-4A3C-
B9A7-B3E8B115E886/140164/Rules_of_procedure_and_Evidence_English.pdf. 
 154. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 127. Witnesses may not be compelled to testify by 
subpoena—their presence before the Court must initially be voluntary. 
 155. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 64(8)(a). 
 156. See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 124 (noting that common law uses the guilty plea 
to sometimes offer a defendant a less severe charge and/or sentence to avoid or accelerate the 
process of trial; under continental (civil) law a guilty plea is basically irrelevant, as guilt or 
innocence is heavily based on the evidence presented at trial). 
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of] the facts of the case” will be assessed to a defendant.157 However, if the 
Trial Chamber judges do not believe these stipulations have been achieved, 
the admission of guilt may be withdrawn and the trial will continue. 
Other ICC rules and procedures admittedly differ from both the common 
law and civil law systems found across the world. There are other times 
where they will be more similar to one legal system than the other, like the 
Court’s allowance of indirect evidence and hearsay evidence when 
considered prima facie reliable and vital to the detection of truth—a tribute 
to civil law.158 These differences and similarities will be detailed where 
relevant in this Article, but this Article’s focus remains on the crimes and 
trial of Generals Than Shwe, Maung Aye, and Thura Shwe Mann 
themselves. In Parts IV(B) and IV(C) infra, the specific war crimes and 
crimes against humanity that have been alleged against the Defendants will 
be reviewed in light of the elements that must be met for conviction. 
Moreover, the appropriate defenses—if any—that the SPDC Generals may 
assert will also be assessed to determine whether their innocence will or will 
not prevail. 
B.  Crimes Against Humanity 
1. Rome Statute Definition 
Under the Court’s guiding law—the Rome Statute—crimes against 
humanity are atrocities that share these common characteristics: acts 
“committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”159 The components of 
this statutory language may be broken down into five required elements: (1) 
an attack is needed, (2) “the ‘attack’ must be ‘directed against’ a ‘civilian 
population,’” (3) the perpetrator’s conduct “must be ‘part of’ the attack,” (4) 
the perpetrator must have “knowledge” that their conduct is an aspect of the 
attack, and (5) “the attack must be ‘widespread or systematic.’”160 For 
purposes of clarity, relevant text within Part IV(B) will be distinguished 
with numbers to help connect analysis with its corresponding element (i.e. 
(1), (2), (3), etc.). The same will be done in Part IV(C) infra. Article 7(1) of 
the Statute goes on to list the specific acts that are connected to the crimes 
against humanity definition; the acts in question are: 
(a)     Murder; 
(b)     Extermination;  
(c)     Enslavement;  
 157. Id. at 125. 
 158. See id. at 125–26. 
 159. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(1). 
 160. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 24–25; see Rome Statute, supra              
note 9, art. 7. 
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(d)     Deportation or forcible transfer of population;  
(e)     Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in    
         violation of fundamental rules of international law;  
(f)     Torture;  
(g)     Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,  
          enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of   
          comparable gravity;  
(h)     Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on  
          political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as  
          defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally   
          recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection  
          with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the  
          jurisdiction of the Court;  
(i)     Enforced disappearance of persons;  
(j)     The crime of apartheid;  
(k)    Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great  
         suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. 
Expanded definitions of these acts and their terminology are noted in 
Articles 7(2) and 7(3), as well as in the ICC–approved document Elements 
of Crimes of the International Criminal Court.161 It is this overarching 
framework that will be applied to determine guilt or innocence for the 
SPDC Generals. With the elements of these crimes established, the 
Prosecutor will be required to prove to the Court that each defendant is 
guilty “beyond [a] reasonable doubt.”162
2. Murder 
“[T]he prohibited act of murder refers to . . . unlawful[ly]. . .killing or 
causing the death of one or more [people].”163 Since 2002, countless 
extrajudicial killings of this magnitude have been documented in Burma by 
UN–authorized Rapporteurs. The Rapporteur findings have shown that 
these (1) murderous attacks have frequently been (2) directed at civilian 
populations by SPDC soldiers.164 With numerous Rapporteur findings in 
existence, it would also be impossible for the Defendants to deny (3) 
knowledge over the frequent murders committed by their soldiers—or for 
 161. See generally Int’l Crim. Ct., Elements of Crimes, UN Doc. ICC–ASP/1/3 
(adopted Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Elements of ICC Crimes]. 
 162. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 66. Article 66(2) says it is the Prosecutor’s 
“onus” to determine guilt, Article 66(3) sets the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard, and 
Article 66(1) presumes the innocence of the defendants until they are proven guilty. Id. The 
same standard will apply to the war crimes discussed infra.
 163. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 33; Elements of ICC Crimes, supra note 
161, art. 7(1)(a)(1), n. 7. 
 164. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Civil and 
Political Rights, Including the Question of Disappearances and Summary Executions, ¶ 41, 
Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/7 (Dec. 22, 2003) (by Asma Jahangir).
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them to deny (4) having a part in these recurrent atrocities, as they would be 
held responsible as the commanding generals. It also is relevant to note that 
the UN Rapporteurs have sent letters to the SPDC leadership detailing these 
grisly actions.165 Finally, it should not be very difficult to prove that (5) 
these murders are systematic—in other words highly organized or 
meticulously planned—or that the Regime’s attacks have been 
widespread—generally meaning on a large scale with many victims. From 
SPDC troops brutally beating a 17–year–old girl to death in Ta–Khi–Laek 
town166—to soldiers shooting and killing a man fetching water near Paang 
Sa village,167 as well as many other horrific stories—these incidents have 
undoubtedly been widespread. These are only two examples of the junta–
driven murders taking place throughout Burma, but the UN Rapporteurs 
have conveyed that at the very least it has been a “deliberate strategy” for 
the SPDC to murder civilians believed to help armed rebel groups,168 and 
with apparent impunity.169
With SPDC soldiers seemingly liable for the elements of murder—and 
thus their Generals on trial through command responsibility—these 
Defendants will have to attempt to put forward a sufficient defense for the 
countless slayings brought to the Court’s attention. The most obvious 
choices would be arguments of military necessity or self–defense from 
militia forces—which may undermine the “unlawful” nature of the killings 
committed.170 The Kachin Independence Army, Shan State Army, and other 
resistance movements seek to end the SPDC’s illegitimate reign in Burma—
often through violent means.171 Yet the actions of these rebel groups pale in 
comparison to the virtual witch hunt the SPDC undertakes in order to root 
out resistance fighters. From killing innocent civilians “under the guise of 
 165. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 65. 
 166. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 66; Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of 
Disappearances and Summary Executions, Addendum, ¶ 472, Comm’n on Human Rights, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.1 (Mar. 27, 2006) (by Philip Alston) [hereinafter Alston 
Comment]. 
 167. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 66; Alston Comment, supra note 166,           
¶ 473. 
 168. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 69 See The Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights in Myanmar, delivered to the General Assembly, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. A/61/369 
(Sept. 21, 2006). 
 169. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 69; The Special Rapporteur on the Situation 
of Human Rights in Myanmar, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human 
Rights in Myanmar, delivered to the General Assembly, ¶ 58  U.N. Doc. A/63/341 (Sept. 5, 
2008). 
 170. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 31(1)(c). 
 171. See Burma Rebel Groups Form New Alliance: Activist, BANGKOK PRESS (Nov. 
11, 2010), http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/205834/burma-rebel-groups-form-new-
alliance-activist. 
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dealing with ‘terrorists’”172 to executing civilians—including women and 
children—merely thought to support these rebel coalitions,173 the SPDC’s
actions will make it extremely difficult for the Generals on trial to 
effectively argue that these “self–defense” actions were permissible or 
“militarily necessary.” In other words, the SPDC military response to rebel 
threats is not being committed rationally or in a manner equivalent to the 
degree of peril they face.174
3. Torture 
“‘Torture’ means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the 
control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.”175 The 
humanity–based crime of torture appears to be prevalent in the actions of 
SPDC soldiers. Examples of people being tortured are abundant under the 
SPDC, as (2) civilian populations are often tortured mercilessly—(1) attacks 
so prevalent amongst soldiers that (4) it would be nearly impossible for the 
Generals on trial to deny knowledge of or (3) a part in their implementation. 
SPDC actions have (5) been widespread—from accused resistance fighters 
in Karen State being suffocated with plastic sheets while beaten over the 
head,176 to women in Shan State being thrashed close to death with bamboo 
sticks to retrieve information on unknown boats in the area.177 A local 
school teacher in the village of Tagu Seik was also tortured by methods 
including electric shocks—Regime forces had suspicions the villagers had 
 172. See CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 65; See The Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Civil and Political Rights, Including the 
Question of Disappearances and Summary Executions, delivered to the UN Econ. & Soc. 
Council, Comm’n on Human Rights pursuant to Resolution 2002/36, ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2003/3 (Jan. 13, 2003). 
 173. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 66; The Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of 
Disappearances and Summary Executions, delivered to the UN Econ. & Soc. Council,
Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/7 (Dec. 22, 2003). 
 174. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 90. 
 175. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(2)(e). 
 176. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 65; The Special Rapporteur of the Comm’n 
on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Interim Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Myanmar, transmitted by Note of the Secretary–General,  ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. A/58/219 (Aug. 5, 
2003) (by Paulo Sergio Pinheiro) [hereinafter Pinheiro Comment August 5]. 
 177. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 66–67; The Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Civil and Political Rights, Including the 
Question of Disappearances and Summary Executions, Addendum, Summary of Cases 
Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received, delivered to the UN Econ. & Soc. 
Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶ 473, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.1 (Mar. 27, 
2006). 
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been hiding weapons for a resistance group, but none were ever found.178
The systematic nature of this torture has also been noted, as it appears that 
SPDC soldiers use these attacks for three specific purposes—to prevent 
civilian discussion of social and economic issues in Burma,179 to root out 
resistance fighters and their supporters,180 and generally to strike fear and 
obedience into the population.181 Once again, this is all conducted “under 
the guise of dealing with ‘terrorists.’”182
When attempting to defend against responsibility for the actions of their 
soldiers, Generals Than Shwe, Maung Aye, and Thura Shwe Mann will 
once again assert military necessity or self–defense for the tortures 
committed against their people.183 Basically, the Defendants will claim that 
their torturous, violent attacks—shown to the Court through the 
Prosecutor’s physical evidence and witness testimony—are a rational 
balance against the level of danger the SPDC faces from armed threats. 
Here, the Generals will again fail in their reasoning. Regardless of the fact 
that the SPDC Generals have never ratified the United Nations Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment,184 it appears that under the ICC “no specific purpose need be 
proved for [torture].”185 Overall, if torture is shown to be a widespread or 
systematic method being employed knowingly by the Regime against 
civilians and enemies alike, it will be impossible for the Generals to avoid 
guilt for torture—regardless of their alleged purposes for using the practice. 
 178. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 67; Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous 
People: Addendum: Analysis of Country Situations and other Activities of the Special 
Rapporteur, delivered to the UN Econ. & Soc. Council, ¶ 60, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.1 (Jan. 18, 2006). 
 179. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 65; The Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of 
Disappearances and Summary Executions, delivered to the UN Econ. & Soc. Council,
Comm’n on Human Rights pursuant to Resolution 2002/36, ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/3 
(Jan. 13, 2003). 
 180. See CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 65; Pinheiro Comment August 5, supra 
note 176, ¶ 56. 
 181. See CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 65; Pinheiro Comment August 5, supra 
note 176, ¶ 56. 
 182. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 65; The Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of 
Disappearances and Summary Executions, delivered to the UN Econ. & Soc. Council,
Comm’n on Human Rights pursuant to Resolution, ¶ 32, 2002/36 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/3 
(Jan. 13, 2003). 
 183. See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 90. 
 184. See generally Elements of ICC Crimes, supra note 161. 
 185. Elements of ICC Crimes, supra note 161, art. 7(1)(f), n. 14. 
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4. Imprisonment 
For imprisonment to qualify as a crime against humanity, it must—like 
murder and torture—meet a humanity crime’s basic elements,186 as well as 
be a “severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules 
of international law.”187 Perhaps the most well–known example of an SPDC 
imprisonment would be that of Aung San Suu Kyi—the democratic voice of 
Burma.188 It is important to once again consider the entry into force date of 
the Rome Statute—July 1, 2002. It is within this context that we must look 
at the imprisonment of Suu Kyi, as before this date there is no ICC 
accountability.  
On May 30, 2003—a date which became known as “Black Friday,” an 
SPDC–recruited mob violently attacking Burmese citizens who were 
praising Aung San Suu Kyi and her political party, the National League for 
Democracy (“NLD”).189 While more than 100 people were killed or injured 
in the attack, no one in the mob was ever tried for a crime.190 “This brutal 
attack was the [SPDC’s] response to the unwavering support shown to the 
NLD during Aung San Suu Kyi’s numerous trips through–out [Burma], 
following her release from 19 months of house arrest in May 2002.”191 As a 
result, this well–known victim would return to house arrest from May 30, 
2003 until November 13, 2010.192 Suu Kyi’s physical liberties were harshly 
divested from her, as she was limited to her home and removed from nearly 
all human contact.193 Moreover, “Navi Pillay, the UN high commissioner for 
human rights, accused Myanmar’s military leaders…of persecuting the 
Nobel peace laureate [Aung San Suu Kyi]. . . . [Pillay would assert that Suu 
Kyi’s] continued detention . . . [was a] breach [of] international standards of 
due process and fair trial.”194 While Aung San Suu Kyi’s string of house 
arrests have concluded as of this Article, her detention in itself still 
 186. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7. 
 187. Id. art. 7(1)(e). 
 188. See supra note 14. 
 189. Ellen Nakashima, Burma’s Iron ‘Aunty,’ WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2003), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A18107-
2003Oct12&notFound=true. 
 190. See id. (stating that it may be assumed that no one in the mob was judicially held 
accountable for their crimes on “Black Friday,” as the mob was recruited by Burma’s 
military junta, the SPDC, to carry out these acts of violence). 
 191. ASEAN INTER–PARLIAMENTARY MYANMAR CAUCUS, THE DEPAYIN MASSACRE 2
YEARS ON, JUSTICE DENIED 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.aseanmp.org/resources/Depayin%20Massacre.pdf. 
 192. Burma Releases Pro–Democracy Leader Aung San Suu Kyi, BBC NEWS (Nov. 
13, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11749661. 
193. NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST., supra note 14.  (noting that the terms of Suu Kyi’s 
house arrest included a prohibition against visitors to her home without the consent of SPDC 
leadership). 
 194. UN: Suu Kyi Detention ‘Illegal,’ AL JAZEERA (May 16, 2009), 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2009/05/2009515144939393754.html. 
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constitutes an imprisonment crime committed by the SPDC. By itself, it 
would not constitute a crime against humanity, as it was a crime directed 
against Suu Kyi and not the civilian population of Burma—despite the 
immense anguish it caused her supporters. However, when her case is added 
to the political prisoners still being held by the SPDC—a number estimated 
at more than 2,200 people195—the political imprisonments in Burma easily 
reach the level of a humanity crime before the ICC. 
In essence, (1) (2) the attack committed against these civilian prisoners is 
their imprisonment itself—a deprivation of their physical freedom that was 
made outside the norms of international law, which requires basic due 
process and a fair trial. Judicial fairness has not existed for these 2,200+ 
individuals—who include many NLD members and Buddhist monks who 
led peaceful anti–SPDC protests in 2007.”196 The vast number of political 
prisoners, along with their wide array of peaceful affiliations and 
backgrounds, (5) makes their holding by the Regime a widespread action. 
The SPDC’s decision to imprison virtually anyone who publically opposes 
their policies makes the situation a systematic action as well. With the 
Generals on trial before the ICC having (4) specific knowledge of these 
incarcerations, and (3) openly taking part in their implementation,197 it is 
clear that their actions constitute a crime against humanity in the form of 
imprisonment.  
Once again, the Defendants’ only option for defense would be self–
defense or military necessity. Yet the protests for change and freedoms in 
Burma have never been violent, nor should they bring concern to the SPDC 
for their own self–defense. Instead, these peaceful calls for change only 
strike fear in the hearts of the SPDC Generals for the fact that change would 
probably mean a loss of their ability to rule over Burma. It emphasizes that 
the shocking violence brought against these protestors by the Regime has 
been far from a rational, military necessity. In fact, it is about as far from an 
appropriate response as is possible, and this basic logic will easily defeat 
any defense to the Defendants’ political imprisonments. 
 195. Who are Burma’s Political Prisoners?, BBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11741612. 
 196. Id. See also Burmese Riot Police Attack Monks, BBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2007), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7013638.stm. 
 197. See NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST., supra note 14 (noting that Aung San Suu Kyi’s 
illegitimate imprisonment extension for violating her “house arrest conditions” was reduced
significantly by General Than Shwe, yet this also indicates that he had a part in—and 
significant knowledge of—its implementation. In other words, General Than Shwe had the 
ability to suspend Suu Kyi’s imprisonment but chose not to do so in defiance of the basic 
rules of international law). 
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5. Sexual Violence 
The Rome Statute’s list of crimes against humanity also includes “[r]ape, 
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.”198
For purposes of this Article, rape will be the predominant focus, as it 
appears to be the most frequent sexual crime committed against the people 
of Burma by SPDC soldiers.199 In order to constitute a criminal charge of 
rape before the ICC, the elements of a humanity crime must be met;200 as 
well: 
The perpetrator [must have] invaded the body of a person by conduct 
resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the 
victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital 
opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body.201
This action must also have been:  
[C]ommitted by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that 
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or 
abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking 
advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed 
against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.202
The UN Rapporteurs for Burma and various UN Committees have 
consistently stressed that sexual violence, and particularly rape, has been an 
epidemic during the Regime’s control. It is especially concerning because 
while sexual violence has been labeled “an area of major concern,” it is very 
realistic that “reports are likely to be below the real numbers of abuses.”203
These international investigators have detailed that (1) (2) rape and other 
sexual attacks by SPDC soldiers have been especially directed at the women 
of numerous ethnic populations living in rural parts of Burma—including 
against “the Shan, Mon, Karen, Palaung, and Chin ethnicities.”204 Often 
these populations have been targeted by SPDC soldiers “as ‘punishment’ for 
allegedly supporting ethnic armed groups. . . . The [SPDC] authorities 
sanction violence against women and girls committed by military officers    
 198. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. (7)(1)(g). 
 199. See CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 51–64. 
 200. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(1). 
 201. Elements of ICC Crimes, supra note 161, art. 7(1)(g)–1(1). 
 202. Elements of ICC Crimes, supra note 161, art. 7(1)(g)–1(2). 
 203. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 57. 
 204. Id.; U.N. Comm. On the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women: Myanmar, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MMR/CO/3 (Nov. 7, 2008). 
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. . . as a means of terrorizing and subjugating the population.”205 This 
evidences (5) a blatant, systematic policy—one that traces its roots to higher 
level agents within the SPDC hierarchy. There is also a widespread practice 
of rape by the Regime’s soldiers—undoubtedly coordinated by the 
Defendants’ direct or indirect mandate.206 A multitude of horrifying stories 
have been reported: two sisters from Wan Zing village were raped by 
Regime soldiers while they were in the fields reaping rice—their father was 
tied to a tree to stop him from preventing it.207 Another woman living in 
Kho Lam village was gang–raped by SPDC troops who accused her of 
being the wife of a resistance movement soldier.208 And “[i]n 2004, the 
Myanmar Rapporteur received reports of 125 cases of rape in Karen State 
alleged to have occurred over a year and a half period.”209 The widespread 
existence of rape in Burma is beyond troubling, and it is obvious from its 
targeted nature that (4) Generals Than Shwe, Maung Aye, and Thura Shwe 
Mann should have immense knowledge of this SPDC policy, as well as (3) 
a say in its implementation amongst the Regime’s soldiers.  
Accordingly, the Generals will have no affirmative defense to prevent 
the crime of sexual violence, and more specifically rape, from being 
attributed to them via command responsibility. While the defendants may be 
able to put forward some form of argument to defend against most crimes 
against humanity on the basis of arguments like military necessity or self–
defense—especially against rival, militarized groups that wish to remove 
them from power—sexual violence will never even remotely be considered 
a means for defense. Like murder, torture, and imprisonment noted supra,
sexual violence by the SPDC has generally been used to target civilians—an 
appalling way to maintain national power. But unlike the three crimes 
previously discussed, sexual crimes are generally held at a higher level of 
 205. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 57; The Special Rapporteur on Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Civil and Political Rights, 
Including the Questions of Torture and Detention: Addendum: Summary of Information, 
Including Individual Cases, Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received, delivered to 
the UN Econ. & Soc. Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.1 (Mar. 21, 2006). 
 206. Elements of ICC Crimes, supra note 161, art. 7(1)(g)–1(1–4). 
 207. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 55; The Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of 
Disappearances and Summary Executions: Addendum: Summary of Cases Transmitted to 
Governments and Replies Received, delivered to the U.N. Econ. Soc. Council, Comm’n on 
Human Rights, ¶ 474, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.1 (Mar. 27, 2006). 
 208. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 55; The Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of 
Disappearances and Summary Executions: Addendum: Summary of Cases Transmitted to 
Governments and Replies Received, delivered to the U.N. Econ. Soc. Council, Comm’n on 
Human Rights, ¶ 471, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.1 (Mar. 27, 2006). 
 209. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 56; The Special Rapporteur on the situation 
of human rights in Myanmar, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human 
Rights in Myanmar, delivered to the General Assembly, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. A/61/369 (Sept. 21, 
2006). 
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distain, as often the victims are innocent women or children and the crime 
involves a destruction of intimate privacy. The author is hopeful that many 
victims will have the courage to appear before the Court with their accounts. 
Their personal stories, combined with third–party witness accounts and 
medical records where available, will be eternally significant in holding the 
Generals accountable for these appalling policies. 
6. Forced Displacement210
The forced transfer of a population becomes a crime against humanity 
when a perpetrator meets the requisite humanity crime elements, and 
transfers by force or deports “one or more persons to another State or 
location, by expulsion or other coercive acts.”211 The force needed to trigger 
ICC liability does not have to be physical either; force may also exist as a 
threat made by a perpetrator against a victim in the form of a “fear of 
violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power.”212
The elements of forced displacement further require that the victim was 
“lawfully present in the area from which they were so deported or 
transferred”213 and that the perpetrator was aware of this lawful presence.214
In Burma, the displacement of rural populations has become an epidemic 
in the last decade. According to reports, these forced internal transfers have 
been conducted as a “security measure” in response to armed resistance 
factions who oppose the Regime; for all intents and purposes, (1) (2) the 
SPDC has sought to displace civilian populations having the mere capability 
to hide or aid groups that might be detrimental to their power.215 In one 
instance, SPDC soldiers physically attacked Karen State villages when 
conducting military operations against Karen National Union rebels. The 
soldiers then ordered the villagers to move to Regime–authorized relocation 
sites, causing civilians to either follow Regime orders or flee the SPDC and 
“hide in the forest or seek asylum in Thailand.”216 The fear of continued 
 210. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(1)(d). 
 211. Elements of ICC Crimes, supra note 161, art. 7(1)(d)(1) (if international law 
customarily permits the grounds upon which a transfer is being made, then it cannot be a 
humanity crime). 
 212. Id. art. 7(1)(d)(1), n. 12. 
 213. Id. art. 7(1)(d)(2). 
 214. Id. art. 7(1)(d)(3). 
 215. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 43; The Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 
of 15 March 2006 Entitled “Human Rights Council”: Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Addendum: Summary of Cases Transmitted 
to Government and Replies Received, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/20/Add.1, 222 (Mar. 12, 2007). 
 216. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 43; The Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 
of 15 March 2006 Entitled “Human Rights Council”: Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Addendum: Summary of Cases Transmitted 
to Government and Replies Received, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/20/Add.1, 222 (Mar. 12, 2007). 
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violence felt by the villagers—along with the psychological oppression and 
abuse of power exhibited by the Regime’s soldiers—undoubtedly triggered 
these sizeable movements. 
A myriad of civilians in Burma have experienced involuntary 
displacement—a process that never includes measurable assistance or 
compensation from the SPDC.217 To make matters worse, “[p]rohibitions are 
put in place for returning to their villages, and if caught they may be shot on 
sight.”218 “In October 2007, sources estimated that the total number of 
internally displaced persons in eastern Burma was 503,000. These included 
295,000 people in ceasefire zones, 99,000 hiding in the jungle, and 109,000 
elsewhere in Burma—including in [Regime–authorized] relocation sites.”219
These degrading attacks on the population have led the Myanmar 
Rapporteur to believe that the practice of forced displacement is (5) 
unquestionably widespread in Burma—in addition to being a systematic 
element of SPDC counter–insurgency.220 The author of this Article strongly 
believes that involuntary displacement—an aspect of the Regime’s brutal 
“Four Cuts Policy”221 for counter–insurgency—is far more disastrous for 
Burma’s civilians than it ever could be for the resistance fighters the policy 
is meant to undermine. This is a disheartening observation which at least 
provides one constructive note—the fact that forced displacement is 
generally considered an element of a larger SPDC policy means that (3) (4) 
the Defendants would be expected to have knowledge of it and play a key 
role in its implementation. Thus, as long as the ICC Prosecutor is able to 
confirm that the forcibly displaced victims were lawfully present in Burma 
at the time of their transfer, and that the SPDC was aware they were forcing 
 217. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 46–47; Special Rapporteur of the Comm’n 
on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Interim Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Myanmar, transmitted by Note of the Secretary–General, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/57/290 (Aug. 9, 
2002) (by Paulo Sergio Pinheiro) [hereinafter Pinheiro Comment August 9]. 
 218. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 47; Pinheiro Comment August 9, supra note 
217, ¶ 17. 
 219. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 44; The Special Rapporteur on the Situation 
of Human Rights in Myanmar, Human Rights Situations that Require the Council’s 
Attention: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar,
delivered to the General Assembly, Human Rights Council, ¶ 69, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/18 
(Mar. 7, 2008). 
 220. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 49; See The Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights in Myanmar, delivered to the General Assembly, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. A/61/369 
(Sept. 21, 2006). 
 221. Sabyashci Basu Ray Chaudhury, Burma: Escape to Ordeal, in INTERNAL 
DISPLACEMENT IN SOUTH ASIA 213, 219 (Paula Banerjee et al. eds., 2005) (“The Four Cuts 
policy . . . aims to cut the supplies of food, funds, recruits and information to resistance 
groups by systematically terrorizing, controlling, and impoverishing the civilian population 
in resistance areas so that they have neither the opportunity nor the means to provide any 
form of support to the opposition.” One pillar of the Four Cuts policy is “forced relocation to 
sites and villages directly under the control of the SPDC military troops.”).
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the relocation of legally present individuals, then the Generals on trial will 
be in clear violation of forced displacement under the Rome Statute’s
crimes against humanity. 
Defending against charges of forced displacement may be one area 
where the SPDC Generals have a slight advantage over the Prosecutor. This 
advantage stems from the Prosecutor’s potential difficulty in proving all 
required elements of forced displacement. Unlike the humanity crimes of 
sexual violence and torture—where relevant medical records may have been 
gathered by international groups to corroborate victim accusations—
validating a forcibly displaced person’s legal presence in Burma may be 
harder to accomplish.222 This is because a person’s legal presence in a 
country is highly predicated on the country itself—in this situation Burma. 
With most of these displaced persons originating in rural Burmese 
communities near the national borders, it may be common for them not to 
have documentation proving their legal status—even if they were born 
within the territory of the State.  The Prosecutor’s best option would be to 
emphasize the potential disconnect between rural and city communities, 
showing that birth certificates, marriage licenses, and other documentation 
are not commonly possessed by people in rural Burma. If the Prosecutor can 
validate this argument and show that their lack of legal documentation is 
caused by deficiencies in the Regime’s governance, then it may be 
unnecessary to prove a person’s legal presence in Burma past the testimony 
of third–party witnesses.223 The testimony of third–party witnesses may also 
suffice if the Prosecutor emphasizes to the Court that these displaced 
persons were separated from legal status documentation through the 
displacement itself. Regardless, a Trial Chamber that chooses to strictly 
interpret the elements of forced displacement might not accept these lines of 
reasoning, so the Prosecutor’s safest angle would be to locate as many 
displaced persons with legal status paperwork as possible to establish the 
practice as a widespread or systematic policy of the Regime. 
While the Generals may attempt to assert the affirmative defenses of 
military necessity and self–defense once more, these defenses would again 
 222. See supra note 219 (noting that internal displacement figures are generally 
estimates). The sheer numbers of those displaced may lead to difficulties in gathering 
statistics. 
 223. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 69(3) (“The Court shall have the authority to 
request the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of the 
truth.”). See also SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 125–26 (noting that “[t]o be admissible, evidence 
must be relevant and necessary”). This does not mean, however, that evidence must be 
wholly validated in order to be submitted to the Court’s record. Generally, the Rome Statute 
implies that evidence need only be prima facie reliable—a nod to civil law traditions—which 
technically means that even indirect evidence or hearsay evidence could be submitted when 
deemed necessary by the judges. This point is eternally significant to this Article, as the 
findings of the UN Rapporteurs for Myanmar (Burma) may at times fall into this category of 
evidence, and without these findings being admissible it would be slightly more difficult to 
convict the SPDC Generals for crimes under the Rome Statute. 
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falter when viewed in proper context. While the Defendants would argue 
that their forced displacement of populations throughout Burma is done to 
prevent aid and support from reaching armed resistance groups, this still 
does not change the fact that these groups are only being hindered 
indirectly—the brunt of this punishment is still being placed on innocent 
civilians. These noncombatants are being used as pawns in the SPDC’s
internal struggle against opposition fighters, and forced displacement is just 
another strategy—like the murders, torture, imprisonments, and sexual 
violence noted supra—for retaining dominion over Burma. 
C.  War Crimes 
1. Rome Statute Definition 
It is undeniable that the Rome Statute’s war crimes provisions are 
challenging to decipher. In fact, the extensive provisions make it difficult 
for a casual reader of the law to walk away with a real understanding of 
their application. While some might argue that the Statute’s vast detail is 
positive—signifying the contemporary regard for war crimes prosecution, 
others argue that this comprehensive set of elements only makes it harder to 
prove the guilt of defendants beyond a reasonable doubt.224
Generally, “[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction . . . [over] war crimes . . . 
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large–scale commission 
of such crimes.”225 Building on this requirement, the war crimes elements of 
Article 8 may be divided into two divisions: those applying to international 
armed conflicts and non–international armed conflicts respectively. Should 
an armed conflict be deemed international in nature, war crimes will equal 
“[g]rave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949” that are 
committed “against [the] persons or property” protected by these 
Conventions—these generalized breaches are noted under Article 8(2)(a).226
 224. See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 43 (“The greater the detail in the provisions, the 
more loopholes exist for able defence arguments.”).
 225. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 8(1). 
 226. Violations of the Rome Statute’s Article 8(2)(a) are namely:
 (i)  Wilful killing; 
(ii) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; 
(iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or   
       health;  
(iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified  
       by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;  
(v)  Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve  
       in the forces of a hostile Power;  
(vi) Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected  
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Article 8(2)(b) also spells out a second category of war crimes applying to 
international armed conflicts. This list, which is more specific in its criminal 
requirements, is largely an extension of traditional laws known as “Hague 
Law” to the Rome Statute—an installment of older, accepted laws of war 
into the contemporary system of the ICC.227
However, should an armed conflict be deemed non–international, war 
crimes will equal:  
[S]erious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts committed against 
persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of 
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de 
combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause: 
(i)   Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,   
       mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;  
(ii)  Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating   
       and degrading treatment;  
(iii) Taking of hostages;  
(iv) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of Executions without   
       previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court,   
       affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as  
       indispensable.228
Article 8(2)(e) spells out another category of war crimes applying to 
non–international armed conflicts. This list, which is more specific in its 
criminal requirements than Article 8(2)(c), largely consists of Protocol 
Additional II—an expansion on common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions that was adopted by UN members in the 1970s.229 Like with 
“Hague Law” under Article 8(2)(b), the drafters of the Rome Statute 
          person of the rights of fair and regular trial;  
(vii) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;  
(viii)  Taking of hostages. 
See also SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 46 (explaining that while “[n]othing in [Article 8(2)(a)] 
insists that these [breaches] apply only to international armed conflict . . . the context 
suggests that this must necessarily be the case.”). For an explanation of this “context,” see 
SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 46, n. 82. 
 227. Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), Oct. 
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 279 [hereinafter Hague IV]. See SCHABAS, supra
note 2, at 47. 
 228. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 8(2)(c)(i–iv). 
 229. See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 51; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non–
International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol 
Additional II]. 
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seemed to defer to their earlier laws of war by incorporating Protocol 
Additional II directly into the modern Court’s extensive structure. However, 
it is important to note that “internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence” do not qualify as war crimes for 
purposes of non–international armed conflicts230—an indicator to States that 
the Court will not interfere with infrequent occasions of violence out of 
customary deference to national sovereignty.231
2. Application to Burma 
As was observed supra in Part IV(B), the heinous actions that the SPDC 
Generals have been accused of are internal in nature—and often have taken 
place as a result of the SPDC’s armed conflicts with resistance groups. In 
light of the non–international character of these actions, Articles 8(2)(c)–(f) 
and the Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court232 will be 
the sole basis for war crime elements in this Article. From these sources of 
ICC law, general war crime elements may be deciphered: (1) an “armed 
conflict” must exist,233 (2) the “internal” armed conflict cannot simply be a 
“riot” or “disturbance” or “isolated and sporadic,”234 and (3) the alleged war 
crimes must have been “committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a 
large–scale commission of such crimes.”235 Every war crime that the 
Prosecutor charges the Defendants with will require that these elements be 
met for conviction—as well as individual elements specific to each charge. 
3. Murder 
Explicitly detailed in Part IV(B)(2), murders have been conducted 
against civilians by SPDC soldiers in order to make them fearful of 
supporting armed resistance groups.236 This demonstrates that (1) an armed 
conflict exists between the SPDC and various opposition groups in Burma. 
Evidence also demonstrates that (3) these murders are committed according 
to a large–scale Regime policy; this may be deduced from the fact that 
numerous Rapporteurs have expressed concerns to the Generals over the 
innocent civilian murders being committed by their forces, and to no 
avail.237 This further proves that (2) the murders taking place in Burma are 
neither sporadic nor isolated. With the three general war crime elements met 
 230. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, arts. 8(2)(d), 8(2)(f). 
 231. See id. art. 8(3). 
 232. See generally Elements of ICC Crimes, supra note 161. 
 233. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 8(2)(c)–(f). 
 234. Id. arts. 8(2)(d), 8(2)(f). 
 235. Id. art. 8(1). 
 236. See supra notes 166–67. 
 237. CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 65. 
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for murder, we must assess which war crimes may be charged to the 
defendant Generals through command responsibility.  
A war crime pertaining to murder is Article 8(2)(c)(i), “[v]iolence to life 
and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture.” This war crime requires that an innocent civilian be killed by a 
perpetrator in the context of a non–international armed conflict. Moreover, 
the civilian killed must not have taken part in the hostilities, and the 
perpetrator must have been aware of this fact.238 Each element appears 
sufficiently met by the facts of the preceding paragraph, as long as witness 
testimony is able to corroborate the victim’s innocence. With the Regime’s 
Generals having command responsibility over the actions of their soldiers—
especially with these murders being brought to their immediate attention by 
reputable investigators like UN Rapporteurs—General Than Shwe and his 
fellow Defendants on trial may be held criminally responsible for 
potentially hundreds of murder–based war crimes, as each individual killing 
may constitute an offense before the Court if properly evidenced.  
4. Torture 
Broadly noted supra in Part IV(B)(3), torture has been another technique 
enacted against Burma’s civilian population in order to make them hesitant 
about assisting local groups opposing the despotic Regime. This again 
demonstrates that (1) an armed conflict exists between SPDC forces and 
rebel groups opposed to their rule in Burma. Torture’s widespread, 
systematic use also shows that (3) it is a large–scale practice by SPDC 
soldiers239—a policy that would be incredibly hard for the Defendants to 
deny knowledge of and responsibility for. As torture appears to be Regime 
policy,240 (2) it would be exceedingly difficult for the Generals to claim it is 
a sporadic or isolated action. With the general war crime elements for 
torture met, we must determine which war crimes may be charged to the 
SPDC Generals through command responsibility. 
One war crime concerning torture is Article 8(2)(c)(i), “[v]iolence to life 
and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture.” This war crime requires that an innocent person have “severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering” inflicted upon them by a perpetrator in 
the context of a non–international armed conflict. Additionally, the civilian 
being tortured must not have taken part in the hostilities, and the perpetrator 
must have been aware of this fact. Overall, the torture must have been 
conducted for the purposes of “obtaining information or a confession, 
punishment, intimidation or coercion or for any reason based on 
 238. See Elements of ICC Crimes, supra note 161, art. 8(2)(c)(i)–1(1–5). 
 239. See CRIMES IN BURMA, supra note 16, at 65; See Pinheiro Comment August 5,
supra note 176, ¶ 56. 
 240. See generally infra Part IV.B.3. 
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discrimination.”241 Each element appears to be suitably met by the facts of 
the prior paragraph, as long as the victim’s and/or any witness testimony is 
able to properly substantiate the innocence of the victim. With the 
Defendants holding command responsibility over the actions of their 
soldiers—and torture apparently being a standard method for instilling 
preemptive fear in citizens to preempt support for armed resistance 
fighters—the SPDC Generals on trial may be held criminally responsible 
for possibly hundreds of torture–based war crimes, as each instance may 
constitute an offense before the Court if appropriately confirmed.  
5. Sexual Violence 
Duly noted in Part IV(B)(5), atrocious instances of sexual violence have 
taken place against rural civilians near resistance group strongholds; the 
attackers of these civilians have notoriously been SPDC soldiers aiming to 
prevent local assistance of armed resistance fighters through fear, 
punishment, and anxiety.242 This brutality–triggering paranoia of the 
Regime’s military forces demonstrates that (1) a formidable armed conflict 
exists between the SPDC and militarized opposition groups within Burma. 
Moreover, the pervasive nature of rape and other aggravated sexual crimes 
in the State show that (2) the sexual violence in Burma is not isolated or 
sporadic. In fact, with rape and other sexual aberrations seeming to coincide 
with most Regime attacks on rural populations, the condition certainly has 
the makings of (3) a large–scale SPDC policy. With the three standard war 
crime elements met for sexual violence, we must consider which war crimes 
may be charged to Generals Than Shwe, Maung Aye, and Thura Shwe 
Mann by way of command responsibility. 
One war crime connected to sexual violence—and rape more 
specifically—is Article 8(2)(e)(vi), “[c]ommitting rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 
(f), enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also 
constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions.” This war crime specifies that the general actus reus elements 
of rape under crimes against humanity shall also be the standard for rape as 
a war crime.243 With the SPDC noticeably aware of the connection between 
their sexual crimes and the non–international turmoil they face from armed 
militias,244 each element appears sufficiently met by the facts of the 
preceding paragraph. Additionally, it is important to note that the elements 
for proving rape as a war crime do not include provisions requiring non–
 241. See Elements of ICC Crimes, supra note 161, art. 8(2)(c)(i)–4(1–6). 
 242. See supra notes 204–05. 
 243. See Elements of ICC Crimes, supra note 161, art. 8(2)(e)(vi)–1(1–2). Compare
with Id. art. 7(1)(g)–1(1–2). 
 244. Id., art. 8(2)(e)(vi)–1(3–4). 
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active participation by the victim in any armed conflict against the crime’s 
perpetrator.245 This point is significant, as it dictates that rape and other 
heinous sexual attacks are never permitted under the pretexts of combat. 
With the Regime’s Generals having command responsibility over the 
actions of their soldiers, General Than Shwe and his fellow Defendants may 
be held criminally responsible for countless instances of rape, as each 
sexual attack may constitute an offense before the Court if properly 
substantiated by evidence and testimony.  
6. Forced Displacement 
Part IV(B)(6) observed in detail the forced displacement of rural civilian 
populations in Burma—a technique employed by the SPDC to obstruct 
possible aid for armed resistance movements.246 Again, the rudimentary 
facts demonstrate that (1) an armed conflict exists between Regime forces 
and resistance groups opposed to SPDC control over Burma. Additionally, 
the widespread, systematic use also shows that (3) involuntary displacement 
is a large–scale practice by SPDC soldiers247—a policy for which it would 
be exceedingly difficult for the Defendant to deny all responsibility and 
knowledge. This is especially true with the practice being considered a 
component of the SPDC’s “Four Cuts” policy.248 Thus, it would be nearly 
impossible for the Generals to claim that forced displacement was (2) a 
sporadic or isolated action. With the basic war crime elements for 
involuntary displacement met, we must then determine which war crimes 
may be charged to the Defendants through command responsibility. 
One war crime concerning forced displacement is Article 8(2)(e)(viii), 
“[o]rdering the displacement of [a] civilian population for reasons related to 
[a] conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative 
military reasons so demand.” This war crime’s elements state that a 
perpetrator in a position of influential authority must have ordered a civilian 
population’s displacement in light of an armed conflict known to the 
perpetrator. In addition, the displacement must not have been justified by 
“military necessity” or the security of the civilians.249 Each element appears 
to be appropriately met by the facts of the prior paragraph, as long as the 
victims and other witnesses are able to demonstrate the viciousness of the 
displacements. No forced displacements on the basis of civilian security 
would feasibly include violence against the citizens themselves—the 
presence of cruelty in the SPDC’s rural population displacements seemingly 
defeats this justification. With the Defendants holding command 
 245. See id., art. 8(2)(e)(vi)–1(1–4). 
 246. See supra notes 215–19. 
 247. See supra note 220. 
 248. See Chaudhury, supra note 221. 
 249. See Elements of ICC Crimes, supra note 161, art. 8(2)(e)(viii)(1–4). 
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responsibility over the actions of their soldiers—and forced displacement 
being a standard facet of greater Regime strategy—the SPDC Generals may 
be held criminally responsible for the displacement of hundreds of 
thousands of civilians, as the practice will probably constitute a war crime. 
7. The Use of Child Soldiers 
While the previously discussed war crimes of torture, forced 
displacement, rape, and murder required less factual study in light of their 
detailed analysis under crimes against humanity,250 the war crime of child 
soldier use has been untouched so far in this Article. Nevertheless, this does 
not mean that the issue is of any less concern to the international 
community. In fact, in October 2002 it was estimated “that 70,000 or more 
of the [SPDC’s] estimated 350,000 soldiers may be children.”251 In 2006 the 
Human Rights Education Institute of Burma would build on this statistic by 
asserting that SPDC “child recruitment rates remain essentially unchanged”
from the figures noted by Human Rights Watch in October 2002.252 The 
Regime once claimed that its military, the Tatmadaw, was solely comprised 
of volunteers who are eighteen years of age or older.253 However, in what 
may be construed as a partial admission of guilt, the SPDC leadership 
eventually “agreed to cooperate [with the UN] in the establishment of a 
monitoring and reporting mechanism on child rights violations. . . . The 
[SPDC] also agreed to provide the details of actions taken against army 
recruiters who recruited children.”254 While these pledges were an important 
step forward in protecting Burmese children from the horrors of armed 
conflict, their enactment has been more rhetorical than truly action–based.255
 250. See generally Part IV.B. 
 251. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “MY GUN WAS AS TALL AS ME” – CHILD SOLDIERS 
IN BURMA 3 (Oct. 2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2002/burma 
[hereinafter MY GUN WAS AS TALL AS ME]. 
 252. See Burma: Use of Child Soldiers Continues Unabated, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(Sept. 12, 2006), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/09/11/burma-use-child-soldiers-
continues-unabated [hereinafter Use of Child Soldiers Continues].
 253. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SOLD TO BE SOLDIERS – THE RECRUITMENT AND USE OF 
CHILD SOLDIERS IN BURMA 6 (Oct. 2007) [hereinafter SOLD TO BE SOLDIERS], available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma1007webwcover.pdf. 
 254. The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary–General on Children and Armed 
Conflict, ¶ 64, U.N. A/62/609–S/2007/757 (Dec. 21, 2007), available at 
http://www.ceipaz.org/images/contenido/Children%20and%20armed%20conflict_ENG.pdf. 
 255. See Burma Army Frees Boy after Mother Pleads through Media, BBC NEWS
(Feb. 1, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8491376.stm (noting the forced 
conscription of a fourteen year old male; the immediate release of the child from SPDC 
military service following international media attention underscores that child soldier use is 
still a problem in Burma as recently as 2010—as the child’s mother was paraphrased as 
stating, “the boy’s release was probably an attempt by the [SPDC] to limit the damage from 
the case, which had attracted a lot of public attention and threatened to damage the army’s
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Jo Becker, an advocate for children’s rights at Human Rights Watch, has 
contended that “[m]ilitary recruiters are literally buying and selling children 
to fill the ranks of the Burmese armed forces.”256 The receipt of money and 
other types of compensation for child soldier recruitment—along with high 
military desertion rates and the Regime’s desire to expand militarily—have 
all contributed to the SPDC’s use of child soldiers in the Tatmadaw.257 Even 
the Regime’s military recruiters have an incentive to conscript child 
soldiers, as military recruits are typically worth rewards for the recruiter.258
Children are often threatened into military service through physical 
beatings, or intimidated with the threat of arrest for loitering or not 
possessing an identity card.259 On occasion, threats are substituted with 
misleading enticements such as free education, a job, or clothing.260
Regardless of the method, Becker believes that “[the SPDC’s] continued 
recruitment of child soldiers separates children from their families, subjects 
them to abusive military training, and exposes them to horrific violence.”261
Some of the children recruited for military training have been as young as 
nine years old, while some as young as eleven have been placed in active 
military battalions.262 It is hard to imagine a child of this age range having 
the mental stability or physical capability to endure such an intense burden. 
Like with the other war crime actions detailed in this Article, the 
aforementioned facts on child soldier use in Burma indicate that (1) an 
armed conflict exists between Regime forces and resistance groups opposed 
to their control over Burma. One of the SPDC’s key reasons for 
conscripting child soldiers undoubtedly stems from their underlying fear of 
armed paramilitary threats. Tragically, using child soldiers is a quick fix for 
their lack of military volunteers.263 Moreover, the vast quantity of child 
military enlistments—once estimated at roughly 70,000 or more of the 
SPDC’s military forces—shows definitively that (3) the recruiting of child 
soldiers is a large–scale practice by SPDC forces.264 Thus, it would be 
virtually impossible for the Defendants to assert that child soldier use is (2) 
a sporadic or isolated action. With the basic war crime elements for child 
soldier use met, we must then determine which war crimes may be charged 
to the SPDC Generals through command responsibility. 
reputation.” Furthermore, “[t]he Coalition to Stop Child Soldiers says Burma has thousands 
of children in its armed forces, some as young as 11 years old.”).
 256. Nora Boustany, Report: Brokers Supply Child Soldiers to Burma,               
WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/10/30/AR2007103002072.html. 
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One war crime concerning child soldier use is Article 8(2)(e)(vii), 
“[c]onscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into 
armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in 
hostilities.”265 This war crime’s elements state that a perpetrator cannot 
conscript or enlist individuals into armed forces or use them “actively in 
hostilities” if they are under the age of fifteen and the perpetrator should 
have known or knew their age to be disqualifying for military service. As 
well, the perpetrator must have been aware of an armed conflict connected 
to the enlistment/conscription need.266 Each element appears to be properly 
met by the facts established in Part IV(C)(7), as long as witnesses and 
military service documents are able to help substantiate the inappropriate 
age of these child soldiers, along with the blatant disregard by SPDC 
officials for military age requirements.267
Still, a major difficulty with war crime prosecutions for child soldier use 
is the basic fact that children are involved. While some children may be old 
enough to testify as victims of the Regime, others may still be too young to 
be asked to testify in such a tough situation. In other circumstances, the 
victims may not be allowed justice because they became child soldiers at, 
for example, the age of sixteen. Since the Rome Statute specifies that war 
crimes for child soldier use may only be charged if the children are under 
the age of fifteen when conscripted or enlisted, this may lead to the 
elimination of countless war crime counts the international community 
unwittingly thought were applicable against the Defendants—as commonly 
the global norm for childhood is when an individual is under the age of 
eighteen. Despite children in trial proceedings being a sensitive subject to 
address on many fronts, enough victims and witnesses will probably be able 
to come forward in order to hold the Generals accountable. With 70,000 
child soldiers as a rough estimate for the Tatmadaw’s condition,268 this 
means that conservatively hundreds of war crime counts could be attributed 
to the Defendants. With the Generals Than Shwe, Maung Aye, and Thura 
Shwe Mann undoubtedly aware of the child soldier problem in their armed 
forces—especially since the issue has been brought to their attention 
without suitable correction,269 it will be appropriate to place command 
responsibility on them for their inaction in fixing the problem. 
Consequently, the use of child soldiers in the Regime’s Tatmadaw will 
probably constitute many war crime charges for these Defendants. 
 265. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 8(2)(e)(vii). 
 266. See Elements of ICC Crimes, supra note 161, art. 8(2)(e)(vii)(1–5). 
 267. See SOLD TO BE SOLDIERS, supra note 253, at 48. According to one former 
Tatmadaw child soldier, Than Myint Oo, “[SPDC soldiers] asked my age so I said, ‘I’m 14
and I was forced, I don’t want to be here.’ They said, ‘That’s impossible’ and left. After they 
left we were made to lay down and were kicked and beaten.”). Id.
 268. MY GUN WAS AS TALL AS ME, supra note 251, at 3. 
 269. See supra notes 254–55. 
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8. War Crime Defenses 
While defenses of the SPDC Generals were not covered as extensively 
for war crimes as they were for crimes against humanity, there certainly is a 
reason behind this omission. The crimes against humanity allegedly 
committed by the Defendants raised no strong defenses that could 
conclusively eliminate the liability facing the Generals. Since the war 
crimes allegations are generally based on the same heinous actions as the 
crimes against humanity allegations, it logically appears as if the same 
affirmative defenses would fail under both broad criminal topics. Self–
defense and military necessity were noted as the major attempts for defense 
that would be put forward by the Generals, and in no way will war crimes 
like murder, torture, and rape be justified by either. Self–defense, or even 
third–party defense, could theoretically legitimize certain uses of forced 
displacement, but these uses would need to be based on appropriate security 
needs for the SPDC or civilians respectively. Here, the Regime has been 
shown to use involuntary displacement as an attack on citizens who have 
not been proven to support any armed resistance group. The SPDC has 
displaced citizens on the basis of hypothetical threats and speculation, and 
this is never an adequate use of displacement. Finally, there is no proper 
defense for the use of child soldiers, as self–defense and military necessity 
could never provide an argument for their purpose in conflict. Simply put, if 
you have a shortage of volunteer, age–appropriate military recruits, then 
maybe you need to change conditions, rights, or policies being enacted in 
your State. Something must be leading citizens to forego their desire to 
defend State ideologies through military service, and Burma is one such 
State where this is evident. True discontent has persisted for years over the 
harsh rule of SPDC leadership. 
V.  AFTERMATH OF THE TRIAL
A.  Probable Trial Chamber Decision 
With three judges presiding over a Trial Chamber’s case, any decision of 
guilt or innocence on the charges facing a defendant must hold a simple 
majority.270 Likewise, the decisions of innocence or guilt on each charged 
crime must be determined by the judges beyond a reasonable doubt.271
When considering the trial of Generals Than Shwe, Maung Aye, and Thura 
Shwe Mann, potentially thousands of allegations may be leveled at these 
Defendants, which are certainly not limited to the crimes discussed in this 
Article. However, the specific charges against these SPDC Generals will 
depend on the Prosecutor’s preferences—which may rest on the credibility 
 270. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 74(3). 
 271. Id. art. 66(3). 
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of evidence, availability of victim and witness testimony, the ability of the 
Defendants to defend against a certain charge, and other additional factors. 
Expectantly, these SPDC Generals will still face hundreds of charges, of 
which it is likely they will be found guilty of most beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The extensive documentation of heinous crimes committed by the 
Regime is astounding. From Rapporteurs assigned by the United Nations—
to independent investigations by concerned third party organizations—to 
stories being conveyed by witnesses and victims alike through media 
outlets—the evidence overwhelming favors a guilty verdict for each 
General by way of command responsibility.272 These guilty charges will 
encompass numerous crimes: under crimes against humanity the defendants 
will assuredly be found guilty on charges of torture, rape, murder, forced 
displacement, and unsubstantiated imprisonments; under war crimes the 
defendants will unquestionably be found guilty on charges of murder, rape, 
forced displacement, torture, and the use of child soldiers. Other charges 
may yet exist, but it will require in depth investigation by the ICC 
Prosecutor and OTP to bring their details to greater light. 
B.  Sentencing and Appeal 
Once the SPDC Generals have been convicted of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, the judges presiding over the case in the Trial Chamber 
will be required to establish an appropriate sentence corresponding to their 
guilt.273 It is important to note that “[t]here is a strong presumption in favour 
of a distinct sentencing hearing following conviction. Though not 
mandatory, it must be held upon the request of either the Prosecutor or the 
accused, and, failing application from either party, the Court may decide to 
hold such a hearing.”274 This technical separation of sentencing from the 
trial itself is important to both the Prosecution and Defense for one major 
reason: time. This added time will allow the Prosecutor and Defense a 
chance to submit aggravating and mitigating evidence that is relevant to the 
sentencing phase. In essence, both sides will be able to offer evidence that 
may not have been permitted at trial but may be relevant for submission 
once guilt or innocence has been determined.275 Examples of Prosecution 
submissions might include “proof of bad character” for a defendant or their 
“prior convictions,” while Defense Counsel offerings may include 
“testimony by the convicted person” or their “psychological reports.”276
In order to avoid undue speculation, fine points on added evidence in the 
case at hand will be avoided in this Article. Thus, with hundreds of charges 
 272. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 28(a). 
 273. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 76. 
 274. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 131–32. 
 275. Id. at 132. 
 276. Id. at 132–33. 
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facing the SPDC Generals—which would probably lead to a multitude of 
criminal convictions—the Trial Chamber would surely impose a sentence of 
life imprisonment each for SPDC Chairman, Senior General Than Shwe, 
Regime Vice–Chairman, General Maung Aye, and a former Joint Chief of 
Staff Thura Shwe Mann. The Generals may also be required to financially 
compensate victims in some situations.277 Their collective knowledge of 
their soldier’s actions is abhorrent, especially when viewed in the context of 
the grisly acts committed by these military against the citizenry of Burma. 
With alarms about these deeds being sounded the world over, it would be 
impossible for the Generals to deny their awareness of the crimes. In fact, 
their lack of real attempts to stop the crimes noted in this Article would 
suggest that the crimes are not sporadic, but Regime policy. With leaders 
like this, Burma and its people will never thrive as a nation. Their actions 
have been a cancer on humanity, and the permanent removal of these 
Generals from our global society would be a benefit for all. With no death 
penalty available under the Rome Statute, the next best option is 
unequivocally imprisonment for the remainder of their natural lives.278
It is likely, with their convictions and subsequent penalties of life 
imprisonment, that the Generals will appeal to the ICC Appeals Chamber 
for mitigation of their sentences or an overturning of their convictions on 
the basis of “procedural error,” “error of fact,” “error of law,” or “[a]ny 
other ground that affects the fairness or reliability of the proceedings or 
decision.”279 There are countless areas of a case which the Defendants may 
appeal from; this includes the ICC’s basic jurisdiction and admissibility and 
basic elements of the trial itself. In fact: 
Where the Appeals Chamber grants the appeal on a point of law or fact 
that materially influenced the decision, or because of unfairness at the trial 
proceedings affecting the reliability of the decision or sentence, it may 
reverse or amend the decision or sentence, or order a new trial before a 
different Trial Chamber.280
However, absent knowledge of specifics that would entice the Defense 
Counsel to appeal the Defendants’ convictions—like new evidence being 
discovered or credible reports that evidence used at trial was falsified281—
 277. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 77(2)(a). 
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the decision of guilt and the life sentence convictions of the Trial Chamber 
will be upheld by the Appeals Chamber. In addition, with the Rome Statute 
not addressing appeals past the Appeals Chamber, it may be properly 
argued that a decision by the ICC Appeals Chamber is a final decision.282
C.  Incarceration 
The process of imprisonment for the guilty SPDC Generals presents an 
interesting state of affairs, as the ICC does not have the authority to operate 
a permanent prison. Instead, the Court depends on Rome Statute’s State 
parties to volunteer their prison systems for these incarcerations.283 If no 
State party steps forward to offer their services, then the burden of 
incarceration will fall upon the ICC’s host nation—The Netherlands—with 
the costs and imprisonment being “borne by the Court.”284 Regardless of 
their final confinement location, it will be comforting for the people of 
Burma to know that these Generals will be unable to preside over future 
crimes in their homeland and that justice has been served through their 
fitting sentence. Hopefully their punishment will prevent future heinous 
crimes from taking place within Burma’s borders. Maybe the removal of 
these Generals will allow Burma a real opportunity to alter their governance 
structure for the better—in a way where human rights and basic civilized 
dignities are lauded and truly venerated. 
CONCLUSION
While mankind has always sought to hold select behavioral norms 
sacred, the methods for upholding these societal values have traditionally 
been inconsistent, culture–specific, or enforced at the predisposed hands of 
a conflict’s victors. Even feeble inaction has plagued the maintenance of 
humanity–based justice—as nations have often watched in horror as the 
ruling authorities in other States have been free as “sovereigns” to harm 
their own citizens. In light of these problems, the birth of the International 
Criminal Court may be considered one of the greatest achievements in 
human history. The involvement of a myriad of States in its creation 
signaled a desire to solidify what clearly offends the global conscience. 
While far from perfect, the Court is predominantly a signal of hope for 
people who have endured unspeakable atrocities at the whims of cruel 
dictators, military juntas, and other oppressive regimes. While customary 
rules of autonomy had often prohibited or deterred States in the past from 
interfering in the internal crimes of other States, the ICC categorically 
opened an avenue for bringing justice to these oft–forgotten victims. No 
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 284. Id. art. 103(4). 
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longer would the international community allow blatant human rights 
abuses to be deceitfully ignored by national governments and judiciaries—
or so it was assumed would be the case. 
Tragically, Burma remains to this day a nation of forgotten victims. It is 
true that aspects of the Burmese struggle have been globally publicized—
like the Saffron Revolution of Burma’s Buddhist monks in 2007,285 the 
horrors brought about by Cyclone Nargis’ landfall in 2008,286 and the 
nation’s efforts for democracy under the support of Nobel Peace Prize 
Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.287 Yet sadly the people’s struggles against war 
crimes and crimes against humanity remain a misfortune being addressed by 
the international community with arguably less fervor. Ignorance cannot be 
used as an excuse, as the United Nations, global advocates, media outlets, 
and world leaders alike have all noted the brutality of the SPDC. In its 
simplest form, the problem is not a lack of information on the heinous 
events taking place under Regime policy—it is a fundamental lack of action 
by a global community claiming to take human rights seriously. And actions 
truly do speak louder than words. 
With this Article, I urge the United Nations Security Council to allow for 
referral of the events in Burma to the International Criminal Court. The 
world cannot continue to be indifferent to the cruelties the Burmese people 
face at the hands of the Regime and its leadership. Until the case is able to 
reach the ICC for trial, I urge concerned advocates to continue publicizing 
the plight of these people. Like with the Court’s creation, a movement is 
more powerful when its purpose and voice are globally unified. But while 
the work is far from over, it must be done quickly. After years of anguish, 
the victims in Burma deserve nothing less. 
Within a system which denies the existence of basic human rights, fear 
tends to be the order of the day. Fear of imprisonment, fear of torture, fear 
of death, fear of losing friends, family, property or means of livelihood, 
fear of poverty, fear of isolation, fear of failure. A most insidious form of 
fear is that which masquerades as common sense or even wisdom, 
condemning as foolish, reckless, insignificant or futile the small, daily acts 
of courage which help to preserve man’s self–respect and inherent human 
dignity . . . Yet even under the most crushing state machinery courage 
rises up again and again, for fear is not the natural state of civilized man. 
     -Daw Aung San Suu Kyi288
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 Our world has changed significantly in the few short months since the 
completion of Justice in Burma. In this timeframe, we have all witnessed 
the upheaval taking place in the Middle East; it is a remarkable unrest that 
has reverberated through states like Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.289 The 
dissatisfaction with oppressive governance is apparent, and it appears the 
citizens of these nations are finally ready to rise up against the crushing 
state machinery that ensnares them. Their demand for basic human rights 
and dignities has been heard by all, and their differing means for achieving 
this end are being observed closely by repressed populations globally.   
The Middle East’s demand for change is obviously being absorbed by the 
oppressed citizens of Burma,290 yet it is fair of them to question the strength 
of their own future resistance actions without real pressure and support from 
the United Nations and other global actors. Recently, the UN Security 
Council voted 10–0 to impose a no–fly zone over Libya in order to help 
protect civilians from violence being committed by the Gaddafi Regime.291
This response to the uprising in Libya was conducted rather quickly—yet 
when the people of Burma peacefully demonstrated for change against the 
SPDC in 2007’s Saffron Revolution, the UN Security Council failed to 
issue more than effortless statements condemning the brutal retaliation the 
people subsequently received at the hands of the angered Regime.292
 There has also been talk of the ICC investigating the Gaddafi Regime for 
crimes against humanity.293 While the author considers this investigation to 
be appropriate given the Gaddafi Regime’s recent treatment of the Libyan 
people, its swiftness does raise questions of hypocrisy regarding Burma. 
Gaddafi’s current exploits have been heinous, but what about the horrors the 
Burmese people have suffered for years at the hands of the SPDC?  
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 One would generally believe that the global community would be more 
likely to seek some level of justice when crimes take place in the public eye, 
but this theory fails when you consider the failed Saffron Revolution—a
Burmese event that mirrors today’s Middle East situation and was made 
known to the world in similar fashion. Simple condemnation is one thing,
but what is preventing global institutions and states from holding the 
SPDC’s leadership accountable for their actions? Sadly, this is a question 
we continue to ask of the global community, despite the clear presence of 
the International Criminal Court. Hopefully the Middle East’s contemporary 
unrest will bring about more answers than questions for the Burmese people 
and those of us who hear their call for help. 
[The State Peace and Development Council was officially dissolved as the 
ruling Regime in Burma on March 30, 2011.294 Now, the Union Solidarity 
and Development Party (“USDP”) controls the State by holding a majority 
of Burma’s parliamentary seats, which were gained in what most experts are 
referring to as a sham election.295 It appears the SPDC leadership intends 
this governmental shift to mask its past indiscretions while allowing high–
ranking SPDC leaders to maintain control over the State in various USDP 
roles. Already, newly–elected President (and former SPDC Prime Minister) 
U Thein Sein296 has established the eleven member National Defense and 
Security Council,297 which is eerily similar to the old Regime’s hierarchy of 
generals. In other words, this is a hollow change that the world must not be 
fooled by. Moreover, this “change” does nothing to erase any of the 
criminal liability the former SPDC leadership holds for its vicious treatment 
of the Burmese population; if anything it shows that (now “retired”) top 
SPDC officials like Than Shwe, Maung Aye, and Thura Shwe Mann298 are 
worried that the world is starting to wake up and recognize the crimes they 
have committed. Thus, a United Nations Security Council referral to the 
International Criminal Court must still be the desired goal.] 
   294. See also Kocha Olarn, Myanmar Swears in New President, CNN.COM (Mar. 30, 
2011), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/03/30/myanmar.new.government. 
   295.  See Zin Linn, Is Burma’s New Government in Military’s Sheepskin?, ASIAN TRIBUNE 
(Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2011/03/30/burma%E2%80%99s-new-
government-military%E2%80%99s-sheepskin. 
   296.    Id.
   297. Myanmar Forms National Defense, Security Council, XINHUA (Mar. 31, 2011), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-03/31/c_13807811.htm. 
   298. See Larry Jagan, The Look of Burma's New Government, ASIA SENTINEL (Apr. 1, 
2011), http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3102& 
Itemid=164 (noting the alleged retirement of Than Shwe and Maung Aye from Burmese 
leadership, but also noting a “‘military auxiliary law’” that would technically “‘allow Than 
Shwe to return to lead the army and country if he feels he needs too.’”). See also Burma’s 
Generals, supra note 144 (noting that [on or before August 31, 2010] “number three leader 
[ ] Thura Shwe Mann [was] said to have stepped down” from his SPDC leadership position).

